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SECTION 1 
INTRODUCTION 
General Aviation serves an important role in transportation and 
in the Nation's economy. But operating procedures are compli-
cated, regulations are restrictive, and the demands of the 
National Air Traffic Control (ATC) system are increasing. All of 
these factors contribute to an increasing dependence on avionics 
and to a corresponding increase in their cost and complexity. 
Furthermore, such diverse considerations as safety, rising fuel 
costs, and the desire to improve single pilot IFR operation will 
stimulate the demand for even more avionics. 
To date, the avionics industry has been able to meet the increas-
~. ing requirements for avionics at affordable prices by aggressively 
applying new technologies. The application of new technology has 
been along traditional lines, however, with integration occurring 
only in a few specific areas such as navigation/communication sys-
tems and integrated flight director/autopilot designs. Using 
this approach, the addition of more sophisticated capabilities --
such as a performance computer, a pilot alert system, or a ground-
proximity warning system -- is expensive and cumbersome because 
of the need for separate computers, separate displays and controls, 
and signals from aircraft sensors that either do not have an ap-
propriate output, or are not easily accessible. However, as a 
result of recent developments in microprocessors, busing, displays, 
and software technology, it may be possible to configure an inte-
grated avionics system that is better suited for accommodating 
these future requirements. 
1 
In 1975, a research and development program was initiated within 
the National Aeronautics and Space Administration to determine 
the feasibility of developing an integrated avionics system suit-
able for general aviation in the mid-1980s and beyond. The ob-
jective was to provide information required for the design of 
reliable integrated avionics. This avionics was to provide ex-
panded functional capability that would significantly enhance the 
utility and safety of general aviation at a cost commensurate 
with the general aviation market. 
The program has emphasized the use of a data bus, microprocessors, 
electronic displays and data entry devices, and improved function 
capabilities. As a final step, a Demonstration Advanced Avionics 
System (DAAS) capable of evaluating the most critical and promis-
ing elements of an integrated system was designed, built, and 
flight tested in a twin-engine general aviation aircraft. 
A contract was awarded to Honeywell, Inc., teamed with King Radio 
Corp., in August 1978 for the design and fabrication of DAAS. 
The specific objectives were (1) to fabricate an integrated avi-
onics system based on the information obtained in the investiga-
• 
tions described in the foregoing paragraph (2) to incorporate in 
this system a set of functional capabilities that will be bene-
ficial to general aviation, and (3) to design the displays and 
controls so that the pilot can use the system after minimum train-
ing. The system was installed in the Ames' Research Center's Cessna 
402B in June, 1981 at King Radio Corporation flight operations 
facility in Olathe, Kansas. Testing began in July, 1981 and con-
cluded with NASA acceptance in October of 1981. After a ferry flight 
to Cessna-Wichita for a new interior, demonstration flights to the 
general aviation community were held in November, 1981 and hosted by 
King Radio. Further evaluation flight tests by guest pilots will be 
held at the Ames Research Center in early 1982. 
2 
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The DAAS Program also includes definition and analysis of a pro-
jected Advanced Avionics System (PAAS). PAAS extrapolates the 
DAAS concept of integrated, fault tolerant avionics to a poten-
tial operational version for the mid-1980s. PAAS was analyzed to 
determine reliability, cost, etc., and impact of the DAAS concept 
in comparison to conventional architecture. The results are con-
tained herein. 
This report documents the DAAS Program System Design, and. 
includes the following: 
• DEMONSTRATION ADVANCED AVIONICS SYSTEM (DAAS) 
- DAAS Functional Description 
- DAAS Hardware Description 
- DAAS Operational Evaluation 
- DAAS Failure Modes Effects Analysis 
• Project Advanced Avionics System (PAAS) 
- PAAS Description 
J - PAAS Reliability Analysis 
- PAAS Cost Analysis 
- PAAS Maintainability Analysis 
- PAAS Modularity Analysis 
• DAAS Fabrication and Flightworthiness Test Results 
• DAAS Installation & Flight Test 
• Conclusions and Recommendations 
• Additional detailed design information is contained in the following 
documents: 
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• 'Demonstrating Advanced Avionics System (DAAS) Functional 
Description, by Honeywell Inc, and King Radio for Ames Re-
search Center, NASA. 
• 'DAAS-System Specification (YG 1210),' January 1982, 
Honeywell Specification DS 28150-01. 
• 'DAAS Central Computer Unit (BG1135), ' January 1982, 
Honeywell Specification DS 28151-01. 
• 'EHSI (Electronic Horizontal Situation Indicator) JG12D4AA,' 
January 1982, Honeywell Specification D538153-01. 
• 'IDCC(Integrated Display and Control Center), DAAS 
HG1052AA,' January 1982, Honeywell Specification DS28154-01. 
• 'NASA-Honeywell DAAS Radio Adapter Unit PIN 066-1083-00,' 
14 September 1979, King Radio Corp. Specification 001-5018-00. 
• 'Software Development Specification For Y61210 NASA DAAS 
Avionics System,' Honeywell SpeCification DS28152-01.. 
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SECTION 2 
DEMONSTRATION ADVANCED AVIONICS SYSTEM (DAAS) 
DAAS is the demonstrator system intended to physically demonstrate 
the characteristics of a fault tolerant integrated avionics sys-
tem in a Cessna 402B aircraft. Following is description of the 
demonstrator system including functional description, hardware 
description, documentation of the DAAS operational evaluation 
conducted on the DAAS simulator, and documentation of the failure 
modes and effects analysis conducted to verify DAAS flight safety. 
2.1 DAAS FUNCTIONAL DESCRIPTION 
TheDAAS is an integrated system. It performs a broad range of 
general aviation avionics functions using one computer system, 
and shared controls and displays. Following is brief description 
of the DAAS functions, controls and displays, and DAAS architec-
ture. 
2.1.1 DAAS Functions 
• Autopilot - The autopilot is a digital version of the King 
KFC200 modified for compatibility with DAAS. The basic auto-
pilot modes are: 
- Yaw Damper 
- HOG SEL (Heading Select) 
- ALT, ALT ARM (Altitude Hold, Altitude Arm) 
5 
VNAV Coupled 
NAV ARM, NAV Coupled C?ntrol 
APPR ARM, APPR Coupled Control 
o Navigation/Flight Planning - The navigation/flight planning funct-
tion computes aircraft position with respect to an entered flight 
plan and data from the automatically tuned VOR/DME receivers. 
In the event of radio failure, dead-reckoning position (as de-
termined from airspeed and heading) is estimated with respect 
to the entered flight plan. Other functions include: 
10 Waypoints, 10 NAVAID Storage 
Moving Map Display 
VOR/DME Data Validity Determination 
• Flight Warning/Advisory System - DAAS includes extensive 
monitoring, with warning capability_ For example, the DAAS 
system monitors engine performance (MAP, RPM), aircraft con-
figuration (gear position, flap position, etc.) with respect 
to flight condition, and ground proximity and informs the 
pilot of undesirable situations. Monitoring includes: 
- Engine Parameter Monitoring Warning 
Aircraft Configuration Monitoring, Warning 
- Airspeed and Stall Monitoring, Warning 
- Altitude Advisory Function 
- Marker Beacon Advisory Function 
- NAVAID Identification Monitoring 
Autopilot/Flight Director Monitoring 
BIT Fault Warning 
6 
• GMT Clock Function - The DAAS computer serves as a GMT 
clock. 
• Fuel Totalizer Function - Fuel flow is integrated to total-
ize fuel used. 
• Weight and Balance Computations - Weight and center of gravity 
calculations can be quickly and conveniently determined using 
DAAS controls and displays. 
a Performance Computations - The DAAS system will determine 
fuel and time required to fly specific segment distances 
given altitude, temperature, wind data, and engine power 
setting. Performance computation functions are: 
- Takeoff Performance 
- Cruise Performance 
- Fuel/Distance/Time Computation 
• DABS (Discrete Address Beacon System) ATC Communication, 
Weather Reporting - ATC text messages (e.g., CLIMB AND MAIN-
TAIN 1200 FT) or weather information at destination can be 
communicated to the DAAS pilot via DABS data link and dis-
played on the DAAS electronic display. 
• BIT (Built-in Test) - The DAAS system will detect and local-
ize its own faults via BIT. Provisions are also included 
for troubleshooting the DAAS hardware through DAAS controls 
and electronic displays. 
7 
• Normal, Emergency Checklists - Normal and emergency check-
lists are stored in the DAAS computer, and are available for 
display at the push of a button. 
These functions are managed via shared controls and displays, and 
performed in the common DAAS computer system. 
2.1.2 DAAS Simulation Capability 
The DAAS system has the capability of simulating navigation and. 
aircraft sensor signals on the ground. This provides the pilot 
with the ability to demonstrate, test or train on the navigation 
and flight control features of the system without flying the air-
craft. 
All controls for this simulator are pilot accessable. By initializing 
to the conditions he desires, the pilot can enter and "fly" his 
entire flight plan. System outputs in all but a few areas (such as 
full flow, RPM, MAP) will be identical to those found in flight. 
2.1.3 DAAS Controls and Displays 
The DAAS Cessna 402B aircraft contains 
• Controls and displays necessary to manage DAAS functions. 
• Additional instruments necessary for IFR flight operations. 
• Independent safety pilot instrument installation. 
- - -- ---
These controls and displays are 1ayed out in the 402B control panel 
as indicated in Figures 2-1, 2-2 and 2-3. Cessna 402B Layout. The 
DAAS pilot is in the left seat" and the safety pilot in the right seat. 
8 
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Electronic displays -- the Electronic Horizontal Situation Indi-
cator (EHSI) and Integrated Data Control Center (IDCC) -- are key 
elements of the panel. 
The EHSI presents a moving map display showing aircraft position 
with respect to desired course. The display is a 4.5-inch mono-
chromatic Ball Brothers 103C CRT raster display unit. The dis~ 
play unit has 256- by 256-dot matrix display capability. P43 
phosphor is used together with an appropriate narrow band optical 
~, filter to allow operation in bright sunlight. The EHSI is con-
trolled by functional control buttons and a map slew controller. 
The Integrated Data Control Center (IDCC) is the pilot's primary 
means of interacting with DAAS. Included are a keyboard at the 
bottom of the unit. and a set of function buttons along the top .. 
The function buttons include a set of page select buttons which 
determine the information that is displayed on the IDCe display. 
The IDee display CRT is identical to the EHSI; i.e., 4.5-inch by 
4.5-inch Ball Brothers monochromatic unit. The IDec can display 
16 lines of 32 characters each. Line spacing is 0.25 inch, char-
acter height is 0.162 inch, and character width is 0.125 inch. 
The IDeC is implemented with menu select buttons along each side 
of the CRT. 
Alternate approaches can be implemented to allow comparison during 
flight test. 
The DAAS EHSI is surrounded by the conventional "T" pattern of 
flight control instruments. 
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The ADI used in DAAS is the 4-inch King KCI 310 Flight Command 
Indicato·r. 
The altimeter is an IDC Encoding Altimeter type 519-28702-571. 
An altitude alert light is mounted on the altimeter. 
The rate-of-climb indicator provides vertical speed information 
to the pilot. The display presents rates of climb, or descent, 
in feet per minute. The face is 2-1/4 inches wide. 
The King KI 226 RMI displays heading and bearing to a selected 
VOR station. 
The DAAS Autopilot Mode Controller is located on the pedestal, 
and the Autopilot Mode Annunciator is located above the altimeter. 
DAAS engine instruments and radio stack are centrally located and 
are accessible to the DAAS pilot and the safety pilot. 
Unique DAAS switch controls located on the panel include: 
• NAV 1-DAAS/MANUAL Tune (located to the right of the NAV 1 
radio) 
• NAV 2-DAAS/MANUAL Tune (located to the right of the NAV 2 
radio) 
• DME SELECT (located to the right of the DME) 
• VOR source switch (located to the lower left of the RMI) 
• ILS source switch (located to the lower left of the ADI) 
NAV Receivers can be tuned manually (MANUAL) or automatically 
(DAAS) . The m!E SELECT switch allows the DME receiver to be 
13 
tuned by either NAV receiver 1 or 2. The DAAS position slaves 
the DME to the NAV receiver being controlled by DAAS. 
The safety pilot instrument set is independent from the DAAS 
instruments, and adequate for safe flight with DAAS inoperative. 
The safety pilot's Pictorial Navigation Indicator displays air-
craft magnetic heading (gyro-stabilized), selected heading and 
selected course. Also, VOR and localizer course deviation, 
glideslope deviation and a TO-FROM indication are presented. 
The safety pilot's KG-258 artificial horizon is an air driven 
unit. It is the safety pilot's basic attitude/horizon reference 
indicator. 
Aircraft master power controls are centrally located overhead. 
Circuit breakers are located on the pedestal. 
2.1.4 DAAS System Architecture 
DAAS system architecture is presented in Figure 2-4. The archi-
tecture is characterized by a modular computer system structure; 
i.e., multimicroprocessors interconnected by an IEEE 488 data bus. 
Each processor block in Figure 2-4, except for the radio system, 
represents an Intel 8086 16-bit microprocessor, 2k by 16 PROM 
memory, and 4k by 16 to 16k by 16 RAM memory. The radio System 
uses the Intel 8048 microprocessor. 
Each processor performs a function, and interfaces directly with 
the subsystems associated with that function. At power-on, the 
bus controller computer CPU-1 takes functional programs from the 
nonvolatile EEPROM memory, and sequentially loads each processor 
at the rate of approximately 1 second per processor. When alII 
processors are loaded, the bus controller activates the system. 
14 
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Figure 2-4. PAAS System Architecture 
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The bus controller then manages bus communications during normal 
operations. 
A portable TI Silent 700 cassette unit can interface with the bus 
controller to allow load or modifications of the functional soft-
ware. 
Central Computer tCC} CPU 5 is a spare processor. If processor 
CC-CPU 3 or CC-CPU4 fails and the bus controller detects the failure, 
the bus controller will load CC-CPU 5 with appropriate software 
from the EEPR.m,! memory, and CC-CPU 5 will then take over the function 
of the failed processor. (Note: This reconfiguration capability is 
especially important when an EHSI and an EADI are included in the 
PAAS system. With a failure in one display, the spare processor 
could be loaded to allow time sharing of the remaining good dis-
playas both EADI and EHSI.) Such reconfiguration could be ex-
tended to other processors such as CC-CPU 2, the autopilot. How-
ever, for such reconfiguration the spare processor must interface 
with autopilot subsystems, which requires additional multiplexing 
of hardware. Reconfiguration was thus applied only to a limited 
degree in this demonstrator system. 
The DAAS architecture is modular. Functions can be added by add-
ing necessary standard processor modules onto the 488 data bus, 
and interfacing these processor modules with the devices associ-
ated with the new function. 
Six processors are contained in the DAAS Central Computer Unit. 
One processor is contained in the IDCC, and one processor is 
contained in the radio adapter unit. 
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2.2 DAAS HARDWARE DESCRIPTION 
DAAS system components, and" their interconnections are depicted 
in Figure 2-5, DAAS System Diagram. Interconnection between the 
DAAS panel instruments, sensors, and the DAAS computer system is 
shown. The DAAS Central Computer obtains data from the radio sys-
tem (radio adapter unit, radio stack), flight control sensors, 
engine instruments, configuration status sensors, and IDCC. 
Functional computations are performed on the input data and the 
results applied to EHSI, FDI, warning/caution lights, and auto-
pilot servos. 
Following is a description of new design DAAS flight hardware " 
including: 
• Central Computer Units 
• IDCC 
• EHSI 
• Radio Adapter Unit 
The hardware is shown in Figure 2-6. 
2.2.1 Centra~ Computer Unit (CCU) 
The CCU, Figure 2-7, consists of the following computer process-
ing units (CPUs) and their associated I/O interfaces: 
• Autopilot CPU 
• Bus Controller CPU 
• EHSI CPU 
17 
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Figure 2-5. DAAS System Diagram 
j' l. L 
Figure 2-6. DAAS Flight Hardware. From left to right: 
Electronic Horizontal Situation Indicator, 
Central Computer Unit, Radio Adapter Unit, 
and Integrated Data Cont~ol Center. 
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Figure 2-7. DAAS Central Computer Unit 
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o NAV CPU 
o DABS CPU 
o Spare CPU 
In addition, the CCU contains a one mega-bit EEPROM memory and 
the regulated power supplies for the DAAS system. 
2.2.1.1 Mechanical -- The CCU is packaged in a full ATR Chassis. 
The dimensions of which are given in the installation drawing 
shown in Figure 2-8. The chassis has been constructed to accept 
up to twenty-three 6.25 by 6.25 inch card assemblies plus four 
larger 10 by 6 inch card assemblies. All interconnections of the 
card ass.emblies are via a wirewrap mother board. 
2.2.1.2 CPU and Memory -- Each CPU has been designed to fit on 
a single printed circuit board card assembly as shown in Figure 
2-9. A CPU consists of the 8086 microprocessor, 4K by 16 of RAM 
memory, 2K by 16 of UV-EPROM, an 8259 programmable interrupt con-
troller, and the IEEE-488 bus interface circuitry. In addition 
to the 8086 microprocessor IC, the processor also contains an 
8284 clock generator, bus buffer logic, and memory chip select 
logic. 
To facilitate software development, the 8086 is mounted in a 
quick-eject socket. This allows easy replacement of the 8086 
with an in-circuit emulator (ICE-86). The 8086 is operated at 
4 MHz by driving the clock generator with a 12 MHz crystal. This 
clock frequency was selected to be comptaible with the ICE-86 
which has a maximum limit of 4 MHz. 
21 
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The 8259 programmable interrupt controller provides the capability 
for eight vectored interrupts. The IEEE-488 bus utilizes the 
highest priority interrupt with the rest of the interrupt lines 
connected to special functions associated with each processor. 
The IEEE-488 bus interface is implemented with the TMS9914 GPIB 
adapter and two bus transceiver ICs. The 9914 is a 40-pin LSIC that 
can be programmed to be a talker/listener or as a bus controller 
while meeting all of the requirements of IEEE-488. This feature of 
the 9914 allowed all of the CPUs to be designed identically. Communi-
cation between the 8086 and the 9914 is carried out via memory 
mapped registers. There are 13 registers within the 9914, 6 of 
which read and 7 write. These registers are used both to pass 
commands or data to, and to get status or data from, the device. 
There are 4K of RAM memory and 2K of UV-EPROM available on the 
CPU card assembly. An additional 4K or 8K of RAM memory is 
available with the memory expansion card assemblies. Memory ex-
pansion card assemblies are provided for the autopilot, EHSI, 
NAV, and spare CPUs. Also provided on the memory expansion card 
assemblies is the I/O address decoding logic associated with that 
CPU. From a software standpoint, all of the I/O addressing is 
treated as memory mapped. 
2.2.1.3 DAAS Mass Storage Unit·----The Intel 2816 Electrically 
Eraseable Prom (EEPROM) is used for the nonvolatile mass storage 
of the CPU software programs and flight plans. This EEPROM memory 
system consists of two card assemblies containing 48 EEPROM devices 
with expansion capability to 64 devices. The mass storage is 
accessed using a bank select arrangement and gives the system a 
base of 786 K bits of storage with expansion to I megabit. 
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2.2.1.4 CCU Cassette Interface -- Tape cassettes are used for 
initially loading theEEPROMl memory with the software programs 
for all of the CPUs. A PROM Utili~y Program in the bus controll~r CPU, 
allows the bus controller to read the ASCII data from the cas-
sette, convert it to binary, and transfer the binary data to the 
EEPROM memory. A standard RS-232 interface is used between the 
bus controller CPU and the ASR733 data terminal with dual cas-
settes. This RS-232 interface, along with additional EEPROM 
bank select: decoding, is contained on the cassette and, EEPROM 
memory I/O card assembly. 
2.2.1.5 Display Controller -- Two ALT 512 graphics display con-
trollers are used to generate the video signal for the EHSI. Each 
ALT 512 contains its own 131,021-bit refresh memory, TV sync, and 
video generator. The display field for each ALT 512 consists of 
two 256 by 256 by 1 planes. The two-plane arrangement allows 
eight different display formats. The mode of operation selected 
for the EHSI is to display one plane while the EHSI CPU erases 
and updates the other plane. Two ALT 512s are required to in-
crease the throughput on the EHSI. The display information that 
requires faster updating is programmed in one of the ALT 512s 
while the slower information, which is updated at a slower rate, 
is programmed in the other ALT 512. The two ALT 512s are operated 
with one as the master, and the other as the slave (i.e. the slave 
receives its video clock and sync timing from the master). The 
combined video output is then transmitted to the EHSI CRT monitor. 
The ALT 512 utilizes a standard S-100 bus for all of the I/O 
interfaces. In order to provide the reconfiguration capability 
of letting either the EHSI CPU or the spare CPU drive the EHSI, 
the multiplexing of the address, data, and control lines from 
these CPUs to the ALT 512s must be provided. This multiplexing 
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circuitry is provided on the memory expansion cards associated 
with those CPUs. Control of which CPU is driving the EHSI comes 
as a discrete output from the bus controller CPU. 
2.2.1.6 CCU DABS Interface -- Both the standard message (SM) 
interface and the extended length message (ELM) interface have 
been implemented for communication between the DABS transponder 
and the DABS CPU. The SM interface consists of a gated clock 
controlled by the transponder, and a bidirectional data line for 
serial transmission of data. For up-linking of information, 
data received from the transponder is converted from serial to 
parallel and stored in a 16 by 8 buffer memory. Upon receipt of 
a complete COMM-A message, an interrupt is generated to the DABS 
CPU which causes this .cPU to read the contents of the buffer 
memory. For down-link information, the reverse process is re-
quired. The DABS CPU loads a 16 by 8 buffer memory and then sets 
the B-bit in the SM interface format. Upon receipt of a COMM-B 
message to the transponder, the data is converted from parallel 
to serial and transmitted to the transponder. 
The ELM interface is a full duplex, synchronized serial binary 
data interface in accordance with RS-449. The following inter-
face circuits are provided: 
ST - send timing (from transponder) 
SD - send data (to transponder) 
RS - request to send (to transponder) 
CS - clear to send (from transponder 
RT - receive timing (from transponder) 
RD - receive data (from transponder) 
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DM - data mode (from transponder) 
IS - terminal in service (to transponder) 
All of these interface circuits are bipolar, balanced circuits 
that operate at voltage levels and. impedance levels as specified 
in RS-422. Operation of the ELM interface is similar to the SM 
interface except that the buffer memory is 256 by 8. This allows 
16 COMM-C or COMM-D segments to be received or transmitted as a 
block respectively. The transponder takes care of all the COMM-C 
and COMM-D decoding and downlink message initiation. The circuit-
ry required to implement the SM and ELM interfaces is contained 
on the DABS SM card assembly and the DABS ELM card assembly. 
2.2.1.7 CCU 1/0 Interface ~- With the exception of the previously 
discussed interfaces, all of the I/O devices (aircraft sensors, 
engine monitors, mode control panels, etc.) interfaces directly 
with the autopilot CPU. This I/O interface provides the capabil-
ity for: 
48 discrete inputs 
48 discrete outputs 
64 analog inputs 
16 analog outputs 
CCU Discret~ I/O -- The discrete inputs are multiplexed into 
4 words of 12 bits each before being read by the autopilot CPU. 
One of the discrete input words is reserved for self test (wrap-
around) of the flight critical discrete outputs. Each discrete 
input is signal conditioned and prefiltered (0.8 msec. time con-
stant) before being multiplexed to a comparator to determine its 
logic state. 
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The discrete outputs ar.e organized into 3 words of 16 bits each. 
The discretes are stored in three 16-bit registers which are 
written into directly from the autopilot CPU. The outputs of 
these registers are buffered with high voltage open collector 
drivers, thus providing either an open or ground. The majority 
of the discretes are used for annunciation and the drivers tie 
directly to 28-volt lamps. The autopilot clutch engage and the 
auto-trim discretes require additional drive capability. This is 
provided with a discrete transistor stage added to the regular 
drivers. 
The discrete input circuitry and the discrete output circuitry 
for 16 of the outputs is contained on the discrete IjO card 
assembly. The circuitry for the rest of the discrete outputs 
including the special drivers is contained on the discrete out-
put card assembly. The real-time clock is also included on this 
card assembly. The real-time clock is a counter running from the 
autopilot CPU crystal controlled clock. It generates an inter-
rupt 40 times per second to the autopilot, NAV, IDCC, spare and 
bus controller CPUS. 
CCU Analog Inputs Four DG 506 16-channel multiplexers are 
utilized to allow up to 64 analog inputs to be multiplexed to a 
12-bit (11 bits + sign) AjD converter. Each analog input is sig-
nal conditioned, scaled, and prefiltered prior to the multiplexer. 
The AC signals are demodulated using an LF-198 sample-hold IC 
with the sampling synchronized to occur at the peaks. A frequency 
to voltage converter is used for signal conditioning of the true 
airspeed signal. 
The AjD converter and 32 channels of multiplexing are contained 
on the ADC and MUX card assembly. The AjD converter is a 
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successive approximation type converter with a conversion time of 
32 microseconds, including multiplex and settling time. The con-
verter is composed of a 562 type DjA converter and two 8-bit 2503 
successive approximation registers. The input scaling is setup 
such that ±10 volts at the input to the AjD converter corresponds 
to full range. The additional 32 channels of multiplexing is 
contained on the DC Inputs and MUX card assembly. 
Also contained on this card assembly is the signal conditioning 
(differential buffer amplifiers and prefilters) for the dc inputs. 
The ac input card assembly contains a Scott-T transformer for con-
verting the heading synchro signals to sin and cosine, second-
order prefilters for the pitch and roll attitude signals, and the 
demod amplifiers for converting these ac signals to dc. The yaw 
servo amplifier, the pitch and roll command bar amplifiers, the 
VNAV deviation indicator drive circuitry, and the true airspeed 
frequency to voltage converter are also contained on this card 
assembly. 
CCU Analog Outputs -- Each analog output consists of an LF-198 
sample-hold which is updated from a 12-bit D/A converter. Of the 
16 analog outputs provided, 8 are used for inflight recording, 3 
for the pitch, roll, and yaw servo amplifiers, 1 each for pitch 
command bar, roll command bar, and VNAV deviation, and the other 
two are spares. The D/A converter is a 562 type that is operated 
in the bipolar mode with a signal range of ±10 volts. The DjA 
converter, 16 sample-holds, 16-channel decoding, and the pitch 
and roll servo amps are all contained on the DAC and Servo Amp 
card assembly. 
2.2.1.8 ceu Power Supplies -- All power for the CCU and the IDCe 
is generated from the aircraft +28 Vdc bus. An Abbott BN1000 
29 
power module is used for the +5-volt supply. This dc-to-dc con-
verter uses a pulse width modulated inverter switching at 18 to 
20 kilohertz to achieve an efficiency up to 70 percent with out-
put capability to 20 amps. Similarily, an Abbott BBN500 power 
module provides a dual output ±15-volt supply. This supply has 
an output current capacity of 1.67 amps on each output. 
The ALT-512 require +12 V dc which is supplied from a linear 
regulator operating from the ±15-volt supplies. All of these 
supplies require approximately 10 amps from the 28-volt bus. 
2.2.2 Integrated Data Control Center (IDCC) 
The IDCC, Figure 2-10,consists of two basic assemblies: the CRT 
monitor assembly, and the chassis assembly. The over-all dimen-
sion of the IDCC are shown in Figure 2-11. The CRT monitor assem-
bly is mounted in the IDCe chassis assembly which, in turn, is 
mounted in the aircraft. 
2.2.2.1 CRT Monitor Assembly -- The CRT monitor assembly is a 
standard, solid state, monochromatic television monitor designed 
for avionics display applications. The monitor is 7.7 inches 
wide, 6.0 inches high, by 11.0 inches deep. ·It is a raster type 
monitor capable of 525 lines with a 2:1 interface at 30 frames 
per second, or a non-interlaced 262-line field at 60 fields per 
second. The latter is used in this application. The monitor is 
designed with P-43 phosphor and a narrow bandpass optical filter 
to produce a sunlight readable display. The display area is 4.5 
by 4.5 inches. 
2.2.2.2 IDCC Chassis Assemblx -- The IDee chassis assembly con-
tains the following subassemblies in addition to the CRT assembly: 
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Figure 2-10. DAAS Integrated Data Control Center 
(IDCC) 
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.2.5 
• CPU and memory 
• Keyboard 
• Pushbutton switches 
• Touchpoint switches 
• Miscellaneous controls 
IDCC CPU and Memory -- The IDCC contains its own central pro-
cessing unit (CPU) and associated memory. The CPU is an 8086 
16-bit microprocessor. The memory consists of 16K by 16-bit RAM 
and 2K by 16 bit ROM. The RAM is used for both program memory 
and scratchpad memory, and the ROM is used to store the initial-
ization programs. The CPU, together with 4K of RAM and the bus 
interface circuitry, is packaged on one card. A second card con-
tains 8K of RAM. A third card contains 4K of RAM. The fourth 
card contains the CRT refresh memory and the I/O circuitry. 
The CPU, together with its memory, performs the following 
functions: 
• Message storage. 
• Message formatting. 
• Output of messages to display refresh memory. 
• Scanning of switches and touchpoints. 
• Outputting and receiving intercommunications with the 
Central Computer Unit over the IEEE 488 bus. 
IDCC CRT Refresh Memory -- Since the CRT monitor has no memory, 
it must be re-refreshed at the 60-Hz field rate. A CRT controller 
circuit is used to accomplish this function. This circuit accepts 
data from the CPU defining the alpha-numeric characters to be 
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displayed on the eRT display. It then outputs the appropriate 
video signals to the monitor to display these characters at the 
60-Hz field rate. The display field consists of 16 lines of 32 
characters. 
IDee Switch Scanning -- The IDee provides for scanning of the 
switches and touchpoints on the IDee as well as the switches on 
the EHSI. The switches on the IDee consist of the pushbutton 
switches (mode and page select) located across the top of the 
IDee, the keyboard switches, the forward and back page switch, 
the message acknowledge switch, and the light touchpoints. The 
switches on the EHSI consist of the nine switches used for EHSI 
control, and the eight switches used for slewing the display and 
cursor. The switches are scanned and debounced using Ie hardware. 
The results of the scanning are entered into the epu via memory 
mapped I/O and vectored interrupts. 
IDee Keyboard -- The IDee keyboard is mounted at the lower 
left corner of the IDee. It projects outward and downward at 
approximately a 30-degree angle for ease of operation. The key-
board consists of 20 keys arranged in a four horizontal by five 
vertical matrix. 
It should be noted that the keyboard has full alpha-numeric capa-
bility. Numeric entry requires only pressing one key. Alpha 
entries, however, require two key entry. Each key has three 
alpha characters in addition to the one numeral. The alpha char-
acters are entered by first pressing the key with the triad of 
alpha characters that includes the desired character and then 
pressing one of the post designation keys, in the bottom row, to 
select left, middle, or right alpha character of the triad. 
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The keyboard is back lighted for night operation. 
Pushbutton Swit~hes -- The IDee has 18 pushbutton switches 
located across the top to the unit.- In the current mechanization, 
16 of the 18 pushbuttons are used. 
The pushbuttons are backlighted for night operation. One push-
button (AUTO SEQ SEL) incorporates a green light indicator. The 
green light is on when the auto-sequence mode is active. 
IDee Toughpoints -- The IDee incorporates touchpoints that are 
used to interact with the eRT display. 
This normal touchpoint configuration is implemented with eight 
individual switches located in the bezel of the eRT display. 
IDee 488 Bus Interface -- The IDee communication with the central 
computer unit is over the IEEE 488 bus. The bus interface module 
(BIM) used in the IDee is the same as that used in the central com-
puter. It utilizes the TMS9914, IEEE 488 bus controller Ie. 
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IDee Power Requirements -- The eRT monitor portion of the IDee 
requires 60 watts maximum of 28 volts dc power, 28 VDe. The 
chassis portion of the IDee requires approximately 2 amps of +5 
volts dc. The only other power required by the IDee is the 
switch lighting power derived from the 28-volt dc. 
2.2.3 Electronic Horizontal Situation Indicator (EHSI) 
The EHSI, Figure 2-12, consists of two basic assemblies - the eRT 
monitor assembly and the EHSI controls assembly. The overall 
dimensions of the EHSI are shown in Figure 2-13. 
2.2.3.1 EHSI eRT Monitor Assembly -- The eRT monitor assembly is 
idential to the IDee eRT monitor assembly. For a detailed descrip-
tion of the eRT monitor assembly refer to paragraph 2.1 of this 
report. 
2.2.3.2 EHSI eontrols Assembly -- The EHSI controls assembly 
consists of a face plate, nine pushbutton control switches, and 
a slew control switch subassembly. 
EHSI Pushbutton Switches -- The current mechanization uses 
eight of the nine available pushbutton switches. The pushbutton 
switches are white lighted for night viewing. In addition, green 
lighting is provided for mode annunciation. The heading-up/ 
north-up map orientation select switch, the MAP REVU-switch and the 
map slew or cursor slew select switches are split legend annunciators. 
Either the top half or bottom half may be lighted green to indicate 
the mode selected. All other switches are full legend annunciations. 
Since the map return is a momentary mode, the green annunciator is 
not used on this switch. 
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All switch actions are momentary. The mode latchj.ng is done in 
the IDCC CPU. As discussed in paragraph 2.2.2.2, these switches 
are scanned by the IDCC CPU. The IDCC, CPU also controls the 
annunciator lighting. 
EBSI Slew Control Switch -- The slew control switch consists 
of a single lever. The lever is mechanically constrained so that 
either horizontal or vertical movement only is allowed. The lever 
is spring loaded to the center off position. The lever actuates 
one or two switches in each of the four directions, up, down, left, 
or right. The first switch activation causes a slow slewing effect, 
the second causes a fast slewing effect. 
2.2.3.3 EBS! Power Requirements -- The CRT monitor portion of 
the EBS! requires 60 watts maximum, 28-volts dc power. The con-
trol switch portion requires only the signal level scanning power 
from the IDee CPU. Nighttime lighting and annunciator lighting 
power for the switches is derived from the IDCC. 
2.2.4 DAAS Radio Adapter Unit (RAU) 
The following functions are performed by the RAU, Figure 2-14. 
- Tune the radios as commanded by the DAAS computer 
- Process VOR/LOC/CS data from NAV 1 and NAV 2 
- Process station identifiers 
- Process DME distance 
- Generate a radio system status word 
- Format the data for block transfer 
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Figure 2-14. DAAS Radio Adapter Unit (RAU) 
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Exchange information with the DAAS computer via the 
IEEE 488 bus 
In addition to interfacing with the radio units, the RAU also 
interfaces with --
- 28-V dc aircraft power 
- KMA 24 audio panel (with KA 35A) 
- KCI 310 ADI (through ILS source switch) 
- KI 226 RMI (through the VOR source switch) 
- DME channeling switch and ILS source switch 
- DAAS/Manual status switch for each NAV receiver 
The DAAS system RAU uses a microprocessor system f.or a flexible 
interface for control and data processing. The interface ex-
changes data on the 488 bus using standard talker/listener func-
tions and handshaking protocol. Also, the system monitors the 
radios, retaining and refreshing a defined data block for the 
data exchange process. 
The processor sends the proper tuning commands to the radios, 
processes the received position data and transfers this data in 
block format to DAAS. The data block transfers occur at a fixed 
rate of approximately 20 updates per second as required by the 
bus controller. 
The radio adapter unit will exchange data over the IEEE 488 bus. 
A dedicated general purpose interface buffer (GPIB) will handle 
the standard talker/listener protocol for transferring data. 
Data will be stored in a buffer to eliminate slowing down the 
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processor. Bus setup time is < 45 ~s and data transfer rate is 
~ 15 ~s per byte. 
NAV 1 and NAV 2 provide a video composite with either VOR or LOC 
information modulated onto the 9960-Hz subcarrier. The interface 
circuit identifies what type of information is present, demodu-
lates the composite, and digitizes the result. The VOR/LOC data 
from NAV 1 and NAV 2 can also be displayed on the KI 226 and the 
KCI 310 indicators. The specific display mode is a function of 
the status switches. 
Glideslope information is also available from the KN.53 Naviga-
tion Receivers. The signal will be conditioned in the interface 
for digital conversion. The digitized data will then be processed 
and maintained in the data block for transfer to DAAS. As with 
VOR/LOC, glides lope information can also be displayed on the KCI 
310 Indicator. The program will select the navigation unit to be 
displayed when in the DAAS mode. 
To validate active channels of the navigation radios, the identi-
fiers will be read electronically, converted to the ASCII equiva-
lent of the received Morse code, and stored as part of the data 
block. 
The similarity in tuning procedure for the KN 53 and KY 196 allows 
a common method of tuning these radios. The interface simulates 
the actions of the front panel rotary knobs by closing increment/ 
decrement switches electronically to change frequency. The 
standby frequency only is affected by the tuning switches. To 
change the active channel, standby is turned to the selected 
frequency, and an active/standby exchange is executed. The approx-
imate worst case tuning time for a KY 196 or KN 53 to sweep full 
42 
.f 
( , 
band is 250 milliseconds. To execute an active/standby exchange, 
approximately 50 milliseconds is required. The hardware for 
tuning the KY196 receivers is included in the RAU, but not the 
necessary software. 
The KN 62A can be tuned by DAAS NAV 1 or NAV 2 through a common 
bus. Then the DAAS mode of tuning is enabled at the DME, one of 
these three sources will supply the DME tuning data. The DME 
channeling switch then enables the desired tuning source. The 
KN 62A tuning format is the 2 by 5 code. Approximately three 
seconds are required to tune the KN 62A and acquire valid 
distance. 
To verify the auto tuning function, or to read the DME channel, 
data is read from the internal tune bus. This data is serial BCD 
inf'ormation. A sync and clock are available to strobe this data 
into the interface. 
The following switches are used by the pilot for radio system 
mode selection: 
NAV 1 Manual/DAAS 
NAV 2 Manual/DAAS 
DME NAV l/DAAS/NAV 2 
ILS Source NAV 2/DAAS/NAV 2 
VOR Source NAV l/NAV 2 
Complete pilot in a manual mode of operation is assured by the 
Manual position of the switches. 
Range information from the KN 62A is 18 bits of serial BCD data. 
A synchronous clock is provided to shift the data into the inter-
face for processing. The microprocessor will convert this data 
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to a 15-bit binary word (LSB = 0.02 NM) and maintain the current 
distance code in the data block. 
2.3 DAAS SIMULATOR EVALUATION: 
Pilot evaluation of the DAAS functional configuration has been 
conducted on the DAAS flight simulator, Figure 2-15. Extensive 
refinement of the functional configuration has resulted. Follow-
ing is a description of the simulator evaluation program and the 
evaluation results. 
2.3.1 Summary of Results 
A simulator program was conducted with the objective of deter-
mining areas where system improvement might be accomplished. 
Specific system improvement proposals were identified and dis-
cussed by the simulator pilot subjects and the DAAS system engi-
neers. Changes were defined based on both their desirability and 
their effect on DAAS complexity. 
System improvements are those changes which would enhance the 
operational acceptability of the DAAS pilot/system interface. An 
iterative approach to the simulator program allows the verifica-
tion of the DAAS functional performance, including improvements 
as they are defined. 
Simulator program change proposals were judged in light of the 
over-all objectives of DAAS; i.e., improve the safety and depend-
ability of general aviation IFR operations without increasing 
pilot proficiency requirements or the cost of the avionics. 
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Figure 2-15. DAAS Simulator 
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Two General Aviation pilot evaluations were conducted during the 
development of DAAS, and in addition, NASA Research Pilot Gordon 
Hardy examined DAAS frequently during DAAS development. 
The first evaluation was conducted in October 1979. Three 
General Aviation pilots participated. The three pilots were: 
J. Lindberg, Instrument Flight Training, a Division of Van Dusen; 
R. Albertson, representing King Radio; and W. Unternaehrer, 
Honeywell Avionics Engineering. All three have airline type 
pilot ratings, although they have never flown for an airline. 
Tw9 _.p!J_~~S_,.biI.1A!lerg_ ~nd Albertson, are designated FAA Fli~ht 
Examiners. 
A four hour system briefing was conducted followed by one hour of 
simulator time for each evaluation pilot. Following this exposure 
to the system, a four hour debrief and discussion was conducted 
on all functions examined in the simulator. Comments were favor-
able, and a number of DAAS features were considered excellent. 
For example, the capability of map slewing and automatic waypoint 
generation received high ratings. The evaluation results were 
positive for the most part, though some concerns were pointed out. 
An example of a concern was the effectiveness of touchpoint data 
entry both on the ground and during flight. The problem centers 
around inadvertent entries and concern for difficulty making data 
entries during flight turbulence. 
There were thirty-five pilot comments made regarding suggestions 
for improvements to the DAAS. Many of these have subsequently 
been incorporated. 
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The second evaluation was conducted on March 1980. Four General 
Aviation pilots participated. The four pilots were: D. Rodgers, 
King Radio; R. Albertson, King Radio; W. Unternaehrer, Honeywell; 
and Larry Peterson, Honeywell. A detailed briefing was per-
formed. The pilots then flew a scenario (see paragraph 2.3.2, 
scenario) in the simulator which required input of initial data, 
navigation data, checklists, interaction with EHSI and autopilot. 
Man Machine Science specialists monitored each pilot in his per-
forming the scenario. Questions and comments of a human engineer-
ing nature were recorded. Following the flights each pilot filled 
out a questionnaire. The combination of close monitoring during 
the scenario flight, the questionnaire data, and individual pilot 
debriefs provided comprehensive evaluation of the DAAS. This in-
formation has been assessed and the results are discussed in 
section 3 of this report. 
The evaluation participants were generally enthusiastic about the 
DAAS concept and functional configuration". Access to data was 
considered to be significantly enhanced. Navigation, with stored 
data base and map display, was considered to reduce pilot work-
load and improve pilot capability in the terminal area. DAAS 
capabilities to support good pilot practices in weight and bal-
ance computations and take-off performance computation, as well 
as DAAS precise navigation capability, were judged to potentially 
improve general aviation flight safety. 
Evaluators generally agreed that (1) DAAS type systems can pro-
vide greatly expanded functional capabilities, and (2) minimizing 
complexity and optimizing tbe pilot system interface is a major 
cballenge. 
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2.3.2 Simulator Description 
2.3.2.1 General Purpose Facility -- The DAAS simulator is a 
general purpose facility consisting of the following primary 
components: 
• Data General Eclipse S/200 CPU 
• Data General Nova 3/12 CPU 
• 16-bit parallel DMA between above CPUs 
• Datel System 256 Hybrid I/O Unit with 32 D/A and 64 A/D 
channels 
• Discrete I/O with 16 inputs and 16 outputs 
• Megatek MG552 Graphics Generator Unit 
• Pace 231R Analog Computer 
The Nova 3/12 CPU and Megatek graphics unit generate multiplexed 
alphanumeric and graphic formats with associated blanking signals 
to drive two independent direct-draw CRT displays. Other digital 
simulation tasks and hybrid I/O are performed by the Eclipse S/200. 
2.3.2.2 DAAS Simulation Hardware -- The fixed base mockup of the 
pilot's control station includes seat, instrument panel, flight 
controls, and engine controls configured to the approximate dimen-
sions in a Cessna 402. Since outside visual scene generation was 
not available, only IFR flight conditions were simulated. 
Functional Controls -- The following pilot controls are func-
tional in the simulator: 
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• Ailerons and Elevator -- Spring centered control wheel with 
hydraulic dampers on each axis. 
• Rudder -- Spring centered pedals. 
• Elevator Electric Trim Switch -- On control wheel. 
• Flap Position. 
• Autopilot Mode Control King KMC 340. 
• Control Wheel Steering Switch -- On control wheel. 
• Autopilot Dump Switch -- On control wheel. 
• Go-around Switch -- On left throttle grip. 
• Throttle -- Left lever functional. 
• RPM -- Left lever functional. 
• Mixture -- left lever functional. 
• Gear Switch. 
• IDCC Touch Panel -- Eight touch points. 
• IDCC Function select Keys -- 18 keys. 
• IDCC Alphanumeric Keypad -- 15 keys. 
• IDCC Enter and Backspace Keys. 
• EHSI Cursor Slew Control 
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Functional Displays -- The following pilot displays are func-
tional: 
• ADI -- King KCI 310 
• EHSI 
• IDCC 
4 x 5-inch direct draw CRT (Tektronix Mod. 608) 
4 x 5-inch direct draw CRT (Tektronix Mod. 608) 
• RMI -- King KI 581 
• Mode Annunciator -- King KAP 315 
• Airspeed Indicator -- 2.75-inch meter with 250-deg. pointer 
range 
• Baro Altimeter three pointer DC servo drive 
• Vertical Speed 250-deg, 2.75-inch meter 
• Manifold Pressure - 250-deg, 2.75-inch meter 
• RPM -- 250-deg, 2.75-inch meter 
• Fuel Flow -- 250-deg, 2.75-inch meter 
• Aircraft Clock 
• Master Caution and Warning Lights 
The KI 581 Radio Magnetic Indicator, listed above, is similar 
in appearance to the KI 226, and was recommended by King Radio 
for use in the simulator. Simulated IDCC and EHSI displays dif-
fer from the 4.5-inch-square displays with in-raster symbol gener-
ation in DAAS. The simulator facility is currently limited to 
direct-draw display generation. Tektronix 608 Monitors 
approximate the planned for use in DAAS. The simulator facility is 
currently limited to direct-draw display generation. Tektronix 
608 Monitors approximate the planned DAAS display dimensions to 
within 0.5 inch, and can be driven by the X, Y, Z, and blanking 
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outputs produced by the facility's existing graphics generator unit. 
Touch points were also implemented differently. The simulator used 
optical beams superimposed on the face of the IDCC screen. The 
DAAS system was mechanized using switches located on the bezel of 
the IDCC. This modification was made as a result of recommendation 
from the simulator. 
Installation of one King KY 196 Comm Transceiver and a KT76A 
Transponder in the simulator is included to provide the means for 
exercising these functions in the pilot's procedural sequence. 
Labeled paste-ups of all remaining indicators are included on the 
simulated instrument to demonstrate DAAS and backup pilot panel 
layouts. 
Simulator Hardware Interfaces -- Figure 2-16 summarized inter-
faces between the facility computers and control/display devices. 
The analog computer is used only for gain and null settings on 
proportional controls and DC-meter panel instruments. 
2.3.2.3 DAAS Simulation Software -- Software was developed 
for digital simulation of the following system and environmental 
components: 
• Aircraft and engine 
• Flight control system 
• Mean wind and gusts 
• Ground navigation 
• Navigation algorithms 
• Sensor outputs 
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• IDCC functions, paging and display formats 
G EHSI display formats 
• System failures and other unplanned events 
Digital Program Description -- The digital program is divided 
into a set of modules or subroutines, all sharing a common data 
base. This data base consists of two arrays: one real array 
consisting of up to 1000 real variables, and the second an in-
teger array consisting of up to 500 integer or logical variables. 
Each element of the arrays is equivalenced to a mneumonic of six 
letters or less. The following software subroutines are included: 
ARPLN -- Aircraft equations of motion 
LACL 
PACL 
ENGIN 
MODSL 
Lateral axis control law 
Pitch axis control law 
Engine model 
Mode select logic 
ADC -- Analog to digital converter 
SERVO Servo model 
DISIO Discrete input/output processing 
SNMOD Sensor model 
ALTHLD -- Altitude hold model 
NAVCM Navigation computations 
SERIO Serial input/output processing 
IDCC - IDCC display processing 
EHSI -- EHSI display processing 
INSTR -- Instrumentation signal processing 
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All subroutines are called by an executive routine which also 
controls system timing by utilizing an interrupt driven real time 
clock. 
2.3.3 Pilot Evaluations 
Several indices were used to assess the pilots' responses to the 
DAAS system simulation. These included observation of the pilots 
during the actual simulation exercise, as well as a paper-and-
pencil questionnaire and informal debriefings following each ses-
sion. The combination of these evaluation techniques yielded a 
relatively comprehensive assessment of the pilots' impressions of 
DAAS. 
2.3.4 Evaluation Procedure 
The DAAS evaluations consisted of four elements: 
1. Pilots were briefed on the DAAS system and the aspects of 
it that were to be evaluated. 
2. Pilots then flew the simulator following a scenario for a 
planned flight of approximately 15 to 20 minutes. 
3. Immediately following the simulator exercise, each pilot 
I 
filled out a questionnaire while elaborating verbally 
on their responses. 
4. Debriefing by means of an informal, on-going discussion 
with one or more pilots present completed the evaluation 
procedure. 
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2.3.4.1 Briefing of Subjects -- Briefings were given to the DAAS 
evaluation pilots who were not directly associated with the de-
sign of DAAS. These briefings emphasized the functional charac-
teristics of DAAS and the particular aspects that were to be 
evaluated. 
The briefings followed the outline as follows: 
1. Objectives of DAAS 
2. Description of Controls and Displays 
2.1 Airspeed Indicator 
2.2 Attitude Director Indicator 
2.3 Mode Annunciator Panel 
2.4 Altimeter 
2.5 Altitude Rate Indicator 
2.6 Electronic Horizontal Situation Indicator and Controls 
2.7 Engine Instruments 
2.8 Integrated Data Control Center 
2.8.1 Display 
2.8.2 Touchpoints 
2.8.3 Page Select Buttons 
2.8.4 Navigation Buttons 
2.8.5 Keyboard 
2.9 Caution and Warning Lights 
2.10 Autopilot Control Panel 
2.11 Miscellaneous Controls 
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2.11.1 Flap Control 
2.12.2 Throttle Quadrant 
2.11. 3 Go Around Switch 
2.11.4 Trim Switch 
2.11.5 Autopilot Disengage Switch 
2.11.6 Control Wheel Steering Switch 
3. IDCC Functions and Pages 
3.1 Initialization 
3.2 Weight and Balance 
3.3 NAVAID Data and Storage 
3.4 Waypoint Data 
3.5 Flight Status 
3.6 Take Off and Cruise Performance 
3.7 Check Lists 
3.8 Emergency Procedures 
4. EHSI Functions and Features 
4.1 Heading Indication & Heading Select 
4.2 Display Format 
4.2.1 RNAV linked 
4.2.2 RNAV unlinked 
4.2.3 VOR 
4.2.4 ILS 
4.3 Vertical Track Angle and VNAV 
4.4 Waypoint Bearing Indicator 
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4.5 Miscellaneous Indications 
MDA or DH 
Waypoint in use and available 
Course 
Distance to Waypoint 
Time to Waypoint 
Waypoint Altitude 
Radios in use 
4.6 Heading/North Up 
4.7 Map Scales 
. 
5. Navigation Features 
5.1 Map Review 
5.2 Map Slew 
5.3 Map Return 
5.4 Use Button 
5.5 Course Select 
5.6 Auto Sequence 
5.7 Horizontal Direct To 
5.8 VNAV 
5.9 Waypoint Generate 
5.10 Delete Waypoint 
5.11 Insert Waypoint 
5.12 Cursor Use 
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6. Attitude Director Indicator 
6.1 Horizon 
6.2 Command Bars 
6.3 Localizer Deviation 
6.4 Glide Slope Deviation 
6.5 VNAV Deviation 
6.6 MDA and DH Indicators 
7. Autopilot Mode Select Panel 
7.1 Yaw Damper 
7.2 Flight Director 
7.3 Autopilot 
7.4 Altitude Arm, Hold and Trim 
7.5 VNAV 
7.6 Heading Select 
7.7 Approach 
7.8 Navigation 
2.3.4.2 Evaluation Scenario, Minneapolis Area -- The evaluation 
scenario was planned for approximately 15 to 20 minutes of flight 
starting with a takeoff from the Minneapolis, St. Paul Inter-
national Airport as waypoint 1; hence to waypoint 2, STILS inter-
section; hence to waypoint 3, RENEW intersection; hence to way-
point 4, BONNA Initial Approach Fix for an RNAV approach to Rwy 
29 Right, with waypoint 5 the missed approach point located at 
the landing end of Rwy 29 Right. Figure 2-17, Minneapolis local 
area victor airway IFR map, describes the flight route. 
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Figure 2-17. Evaluation Scenario Chart 
(Minneapolis Local Victor Airway Chart) 
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The flight time of 15 to 20 minutes was of sufficient duration to 
permit the exercising of the DAAS functions. Preparation for the 
flight, the entry of data via keyboard into the IDCC such as take-
off performance calculations, weight and balance etc., took an 
additional 15 to 20 minutes. Thus, the evaluation pi~ot was in 
the simulator seat for about 40 minutes, which was not long 
enough for either fatigue or boredom to enter the evaluation 
equation. 
The NAVAID Data entered into DAAS is described in Table 2-1 and 
consists of the VOR/DME stations used for waypoint definition. 
Table 2-2 lists the waypoints and describes the vertical naviga-
tion profile. Figure 2-18 is the RNAV approach chart for Minne-
apolis, St. Paul, International Airport Rwy 29 Right. 
The following is a description of the scenario in the order of 
actual events: 
1. Review flight plan as shown in Figure 2-17. 
2. Power-up system - IDCC INIT PAGE appears. Pilot enters 
zulu time (GMT). 
3. Press MENU button and select touchpoint WEIGHT & BALANCE 
4. WEIGHT & BALANCE, Pages 2 through 3 - Enter passenger, 
cargo and fuel weight as appropriate. Review results on 
page 3 to see that the calculated CG is between the forward 
and aft limits and that the maximum takeoff weight is not 
exceeded. Transfer results to INIT page. 
5. Press MENU button and select touchpoint TAKEOFF PERFORMANCE. 
60 
Table 2-1. NAVAID Data for Evaluation Scenario 
NAVAID Frequency 
.. 
No. I.D. Elevation Latitude Longitude Variation 
1 MSP 117.3 880 N4508.7 W'09322.4 6E 
2 FGT 115.7 930 N4437.9 .W'09310.9 6E 
3 N W' 
4 N W' 
5 N W 
6 N W' 
7 N W' 
8 N W' 
9 N W' 
0 N W 
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Table 2-2. Waypoint Data for Evaluation Scenario 
DAAS Waypoint Data Sheet 
NAVAID Elevation CRSI CRS2 Radial Distance Altitude Offset 
WP No. ID Frequency (Ft) (Deg) (Deg) (Deg) (mf) (Ft) (m!) RNAV/VOR/ILS MDA 
1 1 MSP 151.0 17.1 
2 1 MSP 094 28.0 3000 4.0 
3 1 MSP Initial Approach Fy 110 32.0 4000 2.0 IAF 
4 2 FGT 035 13.0 4000 
~~ 2 FGT I 352 '~1400 1.6 1400 6 ~se. Approach Point MDA 7 (MAP) 
8 
9 
0 
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Figure 2-18. 
. . .. . 
... MINNEAPOUS; MINN • 
. i.MINNEAPOllS'·ST. PAUL INn. 
. RNAV'Rwy 29R' 
·1:15.7· .... FGT· .:= .. 
Minneapolis-St. Paul International 
RNAV Rwy 29 Right 
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6. TAKEOFF PERFORMANCE - Enter all appropriate data for take-
off. Review results of computation on page 2. 
7. Press MENU button and select touchpoint CRUISE PERFORMANCE 
8. CRUISE PERFORMANCE - Enter appropriate data for cruise. 
9. Press NAVAID DATA button - enter VOR/DME data for appropri-
ate NAVAID stations required to define waypoints for flight 
planned. See Table 2~1 for NAVAID data entry. Press 
NAVAID SUM button to review the data entered. 
10 Press WAYPOINT DATA button - enter waypoints that define 
intended flight. Review data entered by flipping through 
waypoint pages 1 through 5. See Table 2-2 for waypoint 
(WP) data for evaluation scenario. 
11. Using Electronic Map Slew lever and appropriate map scales, 
review the entire flight. 
12. Prepare for takeoff using IDCC checklists. 
13. Takeoff; engage auto pilot after airborne; climb to 400 
feet; use heading select to turn for an intercept with 
course 1 of WP2; activate autopilot NAV ARM; and as air-
craft couples and settles down on course 1, select auto-
pilot VNAV. Press AUTO SEQ button for course 1 to switch 
automatically to course 2. 
14. Halfway to WP3, make liP3 active by selecting WP3 data page and 
pressing USE button. 
15. Press FLIGHT STATUS button for true airspeed, ground speed, 
wind, ETA, and fuel available. 
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16. Halfway to WP4, make WP4 active by selecting WP4 data page and 
pressing USE button. 
17. Waypoint 4 is BONNA, the initial approach fix (IAF) for 
, 
approach to Rwy 29 Right. At 3 miles from WP4, slow aircraft 
to 120 kts and review landing checklist. See Figure 2-17, 
RNAV Approach Chart Minneapolis Rwy 29 Right. 
18. Over WP4, extend landing gear and flaps. 
19. Select WP5 data page (MAP) and press USE button. 
20. Monitor indicated airspeed to 100 kt and glide slope to 
about 3 degrees on the EHSI Vertical Track Angle indicator. 
21. At the minimum descent altitude (MDA) the aircraft goes to 
altitude hold and passes over WP5 MAP. End of evaluation 
scenario. 
2.3.4.3 Post-Scenario Questionnaire -- A post-scenario question-
naire was developed to provide quantitative assessment of pilot 
response to the human factors characteristics of the DAAS simula-
tion scenario exercise. Rating scales were used to assess re-
sponses to overall system operation, as well as specific charac-
teristics of the IDCC and EHSI keyboards and displays. The 
questionnaire addressed each of the following areas: 
• Overall System Operation 
Workload assessment 
- Adequacy of information provided 
- Relevancy of information provided 
- Time assessment 
- Potential training requirements 
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• Time 
• Method (simulator versus isolated CRT displays) 
• IDCC Keyboard and Display 
- Ease of data entry 
• Time required 
• Keyboard location 
• Keyboard format 
Adequacy of information displayed 
• Major functions/menu selections 
• Feedback for error corrections 
• EHSI Keyboard and Display 
- Ease of data entry 
• Waypoint insertion 
• Keyboard location 
- Adequacy of information displayed 
• General Comments 
The post-scenario questionnaire was given to each pilot immedi-
ately following the simulation exercise. Administration of the 
questionnaire was informal, and verbal comments from the pilot 
elabor.ating on their responses to each item were encouraged. 
Thus, the questionnaire also served as a point of departure fo~ 
the debriefing discussions which followed. 
2.3.4.4 Debriefing -- Debriefing involved informal ongoing dis-
cussion with one or more of the pilots present at any given time. 
Thus, pilots were able to discuss the simulation from several 
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viewpoints. The result was an indepth analysis of both the func-
tional characteristics of DAAS and its general acceptability as a 
future on-board system. 
2.4 FAILURE MODE AND EFFECTS ANALYSIS (FMEA) 
The intention of this FMEA is to analyze the effects of failed 
DAAS elements, the probability of the failures, and how the pilot 
workload and the flight safety situation are affected by the fail-
ures. The importance of the safety pilot is discussed. DAAS 
compatibility to FAR Parts 23 and 91 is also assessed. 
Assessment of DAAS compliance with FAR requirements, and analysis 
of failure effects in general can be summarized as follows: 
• Failure Effects with Respect to FAR Requirements 
- Of the 86 DAAS elements analyzed, FAR Parts 23 and 91 
VFR and IFR CAT 1 requirements are applicable to 36. 
There are no conflicts for fault-free DAAS. 
- 25 DAAS elements may fail without violating any FAR 
requirements. 
- 11 failed elements violate FAR 23.1329.e for the initial 
DAAS design. These 11 failures violate FAR 23.132ge 
which says: 
"Each system must be designed so that a single mal-
function will not produce a hardover signal in more 
than one control axis." 
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Recommendation -- The FAR 23.1329.e conflict was resolved by 
introducing 3 hardware limiters located down stream of the 
pitch, roll, and yaw DjA converters. These limiters will 
prohibit any DAAS computer failure from commanding the 
servos hardover. 
Failure Effects! General -- The 86 DAAS elements were split 
into the 4 failure categories: 
22 Elements - Category 1, Failure Effects Negligible 
36 Elements - Category 2, Failure Effects Inconvenient 
26 Elements - Category 3, Failure Effects Demanding 
2 Elements - Category 4, Failure Effects Critical 
The two critical failures are Aircraft 28-Vdc and Avionics 
28-Vdc bus. The category 4 failure probability is very low, 
less than 10-6 for a 4-hour flight. 
Recommendations 
1. The DAAS failure effects are not critical with the 
exception of the Aircraft and Avionics 28-Vdc bus 
failure. The probability of these failures happening 
is low enough to make them negligible. No action 
required. 
2. Flight safety is dependent on the safety copilot. He 
should closely monitor the DAAS performance, especially 
at low altitude, take-off, and landing conditions, 
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Following are the details of the analysis including description 
of the DAAS system analyzed, assessment of DAAS compliance with 
FAR requirements, and description of the FMEA results. 
2.4.1 DAAS System Description 
The present DAAS is defined in the following documents: 
1. Demonstration Advanced Avionics System (DAAS) Functional 
Description by Honeywell Inc. and King Radio for Ames Research 
Center, NASA. 
2. DAAS System Specification (YG1210) January, 82, Honeywell 
Specification DS28150-01. 
3. Software Development Specification for YG1210 NASA DAAS, 
Honeywell Specification DS28152-01. 
4. Miscellaneous diagrams and papers describing the Cessna 
402B cockpit and servos. 
2.4.2 Assessment of Compliance With FAR Requirements 
FAR Parts 23 and 91 are applicable to DAAS. The applicable FAR 
paragraphs are restated below and comments given as to how they 
are met by DAAS. 
2.4.2.1 FAR Part 23 Equipment, Systems and Installations -- The 
DAAS, when installed in the aircraft, must meet the following re-
stated FAR Part 23 requirement: 
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Requirement, 23.1309 
(a) Each item of equipment, when performing its intended func-
tion, may not adversely affect: 
(1) The response, operation, or accuracy of any equipment 
essential to safe operation; or 
(2) The response, operation, or accuracy of any other 
equipment unless there is a means to inform the pilot 
of the effect. 
(b) The equipment, sy'stems, and installations of a multiengine 
airplane must be designed to prevent hazards to the airplane 
in the event of a probable malfunction or failure. 
(c) The equipment, systems, and installations of a single-engine 
airplane must be designed to minimize hazards to the air-
plane in the event of a probable malfunction or failure. 
Comment: 
The DAAS development program should eliminate adverse affects 
specified in item a. Tests in simulators, qualifications tests, 
and checkout in the aircraft shall verify that no undesired 
interaction exists. 
The DAAS design and included limiters, monitors, warnings, etc., 
satisfy the item b or c requirements. 
2.4.2.2 FAR Part 23, Requirements of the Autopilot -- The Auto-
pilot (sensors, computer, servos) must meet the FAR Part 23.1329 
requirement as follows: 
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Requirement, 23.1329 a to g 
(a) Each system must be designed so that the automatic pilot can; 
(1) Be quickly and positively disengaged by the pilots to 
prevent it from interfering with their control of the 
airplane; or 
(2) Be sufficiently overpowered by one pilot to let him 
control the airplane. 
b, c, g requires a certain cockpit design in order to eliminate 
pilot confusion and simplify use of the autopilot. 
a,d,e,f requires a certain system design to minimize the impact 
of autopilot malfunction. 
Comment: 
The autopilot dump switches (control wheel, Nz-accelerometer) and 
the slip clutch included in the elevator, aileron, and rudder 
servos provide the required protection. 
The slip clutches are designed to prevent excessive accelerations. 
Requirement 23.1329 b 
(b) Unless there is automatic synchronization, each system must 
have a means to readily indicate to the pilot the alignment 
of the actuating device in relation to the control system it 
operates. 
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Comment: 
The position of the control wheel, pedals and the trim indicators 
indicate the alignment. 
Requirement 23.1329 c 
Cc) Each m~nually operated control for the system operation must 
be readily accessible to the pilot. Each control must oper-
ate in the same plane and sense of motion as specified in 
23.779 for cockpit controls. The direction of motion must 
be plainly indicated on or near each control. 
Comment: 
DAAS panel layout agrees with the FAR requirements. 
Requirement 23.1329 d 
Cd) Each system must be designed and adjusted so that, within 
the range of adjustment available to the pilot, it cannot 
produce hazardous loads on the airplane or create hazard-
ous deviations in the flight path, under any flight condi-
tion appropriate to its use, either during normal operation 
or in the event of a malfunction, assuming that corrective 
action begins within a reasonable period of time. 
Comment: 
Met by 
1. Software limiters, 3-axis 
2. Software "faders" in pitch and roll 
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3. Slip clutches 
4. Pitch trim monitor 
5. The Nz> ""lG-Dump accelerometer". 
Requirement 23.1329 e 
(e) Each system must be designed so that a single malfunction 
will not produce a hardover signal in more than one control 
axis~ If the automatic pilot integrates signals from auxil-
iary controls or furnished signals for operation of other 
equipment, positive interlocks and sequencing of engagement 
to prevent improper operation are required. 
Comment: 
This requirement can be met by implementation of hardware servo 
command limiters. (Note: Limiters have been added to flight 
system. ) 
Requirement 23.1329 f 
(f) There must be protection against adverse interaction of 
integrated components, resulting from a malfunction. 
Comment: 
Met by 
1. Buffers eliminating part damage. 
2. Limiters and monitors eliminating excessive commands. 
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Requirement 23.1329 g 
(g) If the automatic pilot system can be coupled to airborne 
navigation equipment, means must be provided to indicate to 
the flight crew the current mode of operation. Selector 
switch position is not acceptable as a means of indication. 
Comment: 
The annunciator panel provides the requested information. 
2.4.2.3 FAR Part 91, Instruments, and Equipment Requirements --
FAR Part 91.33, a to e, specifies instrument and equipment re-
quired for powered civil aircraft with U.S. air worthiness cer-
tificates as follows: 
91.33 (a) General 
(b) VFR flight, day 
(c) VFR flight, night 
(d) IFR flight, category I 
(e) IFR flight, category above 24,000 feet 
(f) IFR flight, category II 
IFR category II is not applicable to DAAS. 
The requirements are summarized as follows. 
Requirement 91.33b 
(b) Instruments required for VFR Flying, Day 
(1) Airspeed indicator. 
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(2) Altimeter. 
(3) Magnetic direction indicator. 
(4) Tachometer for each engine. 
(5) Oil pressure gauge for each engine using pressure 
system. 
(6) Temperature gauge for each liquid-cooled engine. 
(7) Oil temperature gauge for each air-cooled engine. 
(8) Manifold pressure gauge for each engine. 
(9) Fuel gauge indicating the quantity of fuel in each tank. 
(10) Landing gear position indicator, if the aircraft has a 
retractable landing gear. 
Comment -- The DAAS instrumentation includes the basic instruments 
required for VFR flight during daytime. 
Requirement 91.33c 
(c) For VFR night flights additional lights and an anticollision 
light system are required. 
Comment -- The DAAS aircraft is properly equipped in this respect. 
Requirement 91.33d 
(d) For IFR flight the following instruments and equipment are 
required: 
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(1) Instruments and equipment specified in paragraph (b) 
of this section and for night flight, instruments and 
equipment specified in paragraph (c) of this section. 
(2) Two-way radio communications system and navigational 
equipment appropriate to the ground facilities to be 
used. 
(3) Gyroscopic rate-or-turn indicator. 
(4) Slip-skid indicator. 
(5) Sensitive altimeter adjustable for barometric pressure. 
(6) A clock displaying hours, minutes, and seconds with a 
sweep-second pointer or digital presentation ... 
(7) Generator of adequate capabity. 
(8) Gyroscopic bank and pitch indicator (artificial horizon). 
(9) Gyroscopic direction indicator (directional gyro or 
equivalent) . 
Comment -- The above listed instrumentation are included in DAAS. 
There is no requirement on redundancy stated in this paragraph. 
Requirement 91.33e 
(e) IFR flight at and above 24,000 feet MSL. 
If VOR navigational equipment is required under paragraph 
(d) (2) of this section, no person may operate a U.S. regis-
tered civil aircraft within the 50 states, and the District 
of Columbia, at or above 24,000 feet MSL unless that air-
craft is equipped with approved distance measuring equipment 
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(DME). When DME required by this paragraph fails at and 
above 24,000 feet MSL, the pilot in command of the aircraft 
shall ~otify ATe immediately, and may then continue opera-
tions at and above 24,000 feet MSL to the next airport of 
intended landing at which repairs or replacement of the 
equipment can be made. 
2.4.3 DAAS Failure Modes and Effects Analysis Results 
The DAAS FMEA was conducted to determine effects of failures in 
the DAAS hardware. Assumptions for the analysis were as follows: 
• DAAS is designed for category I IFR operation 
• All single failures and dual failures with high failure· 
rates are studied. 
• Any failure in any element is assumed to result in a lost 
function of that element, which makes this a "worst case" 
analysis. 
• The autopilot slip-clutches, the pilot (and Nz ) dump 
switches, and the pilot and copilot override possibilities 
provide the pilots adequate means to safely handle any 
single control axis hardover servo failure. 
• The probability of a critical situation less than 10-
6 in a 
4-hour flight is judged to be negligible. 
• Preflight test and inflight bit are performed. Autopilot 
dump switching, normal acceleration dump switch, and servo 
clutch switches must be checked. 
77 
The preflight test coverage will be less than 100 percent 
due to nontestable elements. Expected fault detection 
coverage is: 
Sensors 
Computers 
Indicators and Servos 
Monitors, Dump Switches, Clutches 
70-80% 
90-95% 
80-90% 
100% 
Some takeoffs may take place with faulty system elements due 
to less than 100 percent preflight test coverage. 
• Effective DAAS software validation will be performed. 
• The four Failure,Categories are: 
1. Negligible to the pilot 
2. Inconvenient to the pilot 
3. Demanding to the pilot 
4. Critical, evident risk for catastrophe 
Fault categorization assumes a single pilot. In the conclu-
sions, judgments are given on how the safety pilot improves 
the DAAS flight-safety situation and how failure probabili-
ties affects the DAAS flight safety situation. 
• FAR Part 23 and 91 requirements are assumed to define a mini-
mum avionics system, which is normally safe to fly. 
~ DAAS failure rates used in the FMEA are as listed in Table 
2-3. The failure rate is the probability of a failure in a 
DAAS element during 1 hour flight. 
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Table 2-3. DAAS Elements Failure Rates 
Elements Type Quantity Failure Total Comments No. n Rates Rates 
1. DAAS Elements Hardwired to DAAS-ComEuters 
EEPROM Memory 1 500 500 Failure rates not available 
CPU & RAMI PROM SOS6 7 60 420 (20 and SO%) 
Radio Adapt. Box (S74S) 1 40 40 
BIM (9914) S 12 96 
4SS-Bus 1 1 1 Incl. 2 Connectors 
A/D, DIA, /dux 1 60 60 
ERSI 1 300 300 
IDCC 1 300 300 
IDCC Keyboard 1 50 50 
ADI EC1310 1 340 340 
RMI KZ226 1 330 330 
CX-Sens. & Indic. 1 100 100 
Pitot System L 1 50 50 Not electrically hardwired! 
Encod. Al tim. -571 1 200 200 
Audio Cont. Panel KMA 24 1 200 200 
Comm. Tranceivers KY196 2 330 660 
VOR Receivers KN53 2 250 500 
DME Receivers KN62A 1 500 500 
Transponder KT76A 1 400 400 
Mode Controller KMC-340 1 340 340 
Annunciator Panel KAP-315 1 30 30 
MAG X MTR KMT112 1 20 20 
Directional Gyro KSG105 1 330 330 
Slave Control KA-51A 1 10 10 
Vertical GYRO VG 20S 1 330 330 
Radar Altimeter RT-271 1 500 500 
ADC KDC-3S0 1 200 200 
True Air Speed VA 210 1 100 100 Incl. F/V Converter 
Outer Air Temp. 1 10 10 Incl. Sign. Conditioning 
Yaw Rate GYRO GG 2472 1 50 50 
Engine Map 2 5 10 
Engine RPM 2 10 20 Incl. F/V Converter 
Engine Fuel Flow 2 5 10 
Cowl Flap Pos. 2 5 10 
Flap Pos. 1 20 20 
Elev. Trim Pos. 1 20 20 
Yaw Servo 1 70 70 Incl. Clutch & Amplif. 
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Table 2-3. DAAS Elements Failure Rates (2 of 2) 
Elements Type Quantity Failure Total Comments !{o. n Rates Rates 
Roll Servo 1 70 70 Incl. Clutch & Amplif. 
Pitch Servo 1 70 70 Incl. Clutch & Amplif . 
Pitch Trim Servo 1 50 50 Incl. Clutch & Ampl1f. 
2. DAAS Instrumentation not Hardwired to DAAS ComEuters --, 
-:. 
lAS 1 280 280 Pitot System L. 
VSI 1 100 100 Pitot System L. 
Turn & Bank 1 150 150 
Fuel Quantity 1 150 150 
Map 1 10 10 
RPM 1 10 10 
Fuel Flow 1 10 10 
EGT 1 10 10 
Engine Status 2 20 40 
3. Co-Pilot Back UE Instrumentation 
Pitot System R 1 50 50 
lAS 1 280 280 
Altimeter 1 180 180 
-. VSI 1 100 100 
Turn & Bank 1 150 150 
Artific. Horizon KG258 1 670 670 
PNI KC525A 1 330 330 -! 
Slave CTRL KA-51A 1 10 10 
Direct. GYRO KG102-A 1 400 400 
-, 
MAG X MTR KMT112A 1 20 20 
Comm. Tranceiver 422A 1 660 660 
VOR/GS. Receiver 442A/443A 1 500 500 Incl. Nav. Converter 
4. Electrical Power S/:stem 
A/C 28VDC Bus 1 <.1 <.1 Redundant Alternators pilot disconnect faulty 
Avionics 28VDC Bus 1 <.1 <.1 battery! ! 
DAAS A 28VDC Bus 1 -.1 -.1 Valid as long as DAAS 
DAAS B 28VDC Bus 1 -.1 -.1 Battery Lasts (-1 hr.) 
DAAS Battery Chrgr 1 5 5 
DAAS Battery 1 100 100 
DC/AC Invertor 1 10 10 
DC/DC Converter 2 15 30 
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For the failure probability estimates, 4 hours flight time 
are assumed. 
The failure rates in Table 2-3 are collected from adjusted 
MIL-HDB-217B data, vendors reliability data, Honeywell pre-
dicted failure rates and by comparison to known similarly 
complex elements. 
The failure rates should be representative of components and 
parts available in 1979/80. 
F1ffiA results are compiled in Appendix A. The DAAS elements are 
defined on these forms and the type of failure and the failure-
rates are also listed. The impact of a faulty element on down-
stream DAAS elements is also indicated. 
Finally, a judgment is made as to how the failed element will in-
crease the pilot effort required to complete his flight. The 
failures are divided into the four categories on the basis of 
this judgment. 
The DAAS failure category is assigned assuming a co-ilot in the 
right seat. 
Appendix A also indicates whether: 
• 
• 
• 
FAR requirement are applicable and met. 
Failure probabilities are significant to the risk situation. 
DAAS would be safe to fly wit~ the analyzed element faulty. 
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The FMEA covers the consequences of 86 failed DAAS elements. 
Table 2-4 summarizes failure categories and indicates whether 
applicable FAR requirements are met. Comments on redundancy, 
failure probability, etc., are given for some failed elements. 
These FMEA results indicate that fault-free DAAS meets the FAR 
Part 23 and 91 requirements. DAAS does provide the required 
means for override and disengage after a failure. 
FAR requirements may more or less be violated if DAAS elements 
fail. Of the 86 failed DAAS elements studied, FAR VFR or IFR Cat 
I requirements apply to 36. For these 36 failed elements, 11 
violate the FAR requirements. FAR requirements that apply to 
general VFR flight, and 6 of these are not met. 13 requirements 
applying to IFR Cat I, 5 are not met. 16 requirements apply to 
IFR Cat II; DAAS is not certified for Category II. 
The violated paragraph is 23.1329(e) which says: 
"Each system must be designed so that a single malfunction 
will not produce a hardover signal in more than one control 
axis." 
Violation in the initial design occur for failure in: 
• AlP, NAV, Bus Controller, Processors 
• 488-Bus 
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Failure 
No. 
1 
2 
3 
4 
5 
6 
7 
8 
9 
10 
11 
12 
13 
14 
15 
16 
17 
18 
19 
20 
21 
22 
23 
24 
25 
26 
27 
28 
29 
30 
31 
32 
Table 2-4. Summary of the DAAS Failure Modes and 
Effects Analysis 
Element Far Req. Failure Comments Met Category 
Encod. Altimeter OK Cat 1 3 Misleads ATC Proximity W-Error 
Altimeter Co-Pilot OK Cat 2 2 
Radar Altimeter OK 2 
TAS N/A 2 
IAS Pilot OK Cat 1 2 
IAS Co-Pilot OK Cat 2 1 
ADC (380) N/A 2 Min. Alt. for ALT HOLD Recommended 
Pitot System L OK Cat 1 3 
Pitot System R OK Cat 2 1 
Oat N/A 2 
Pilot Mag. XTMR OK Cat 1 3 
Pilot Slave Indic. N/A 1 
Pilot Direct GYRO OK Cat 1 3 
Pilot RMI OK Cat 1 2 
Co-Pilot Mag. XTMR OK Cat 2 1 
Co-Pilot Slave Indic N/A 1 
Co-Pilot Direct GYRO OK Cat 2 1 
Co-Pilot PNI OK Cat 2 1 
Pilot Turn & Slip OK Cat 2 1 
Co-Pilot Turn & Slip OK Cat 2 1 
Yaw Rate GYRO N/A 2 
X-Sensor & Indicator N/A 2 
Pilot Vertical-GYRO OK Cat 1 2 
Pilot ADI OK Cat 1 2 
Co-Pilot Art if . Horiz. OK Cat 2 1 
Map Instrument OK Cat 2 2 
RPM Instrument OK Cat 2 2 
EGT Instrument N/A 2 
Eng. Status 1 OK Cat 2 3 Pilot Action 
Eng. Status 2 OK Cat 2 3 As if Engine Failure 
Fuel Flow Sens. 1 N/A 2 
Fuel Flow Sens. 2 N/A 2 
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Failure 
No. 
33 
34 
35 
36 
37 
38 
39 
40 
41 
42 
43 
44 
45 
46 
47 a 
b 
48 a 
49 
50 
51 
52 
53 
54 
55 
56 
57 
58 
59 
60 
b 
Table 2-4. Summary of the DAAS Failure Modes and 
Effects Analysis (Sheet 2 of 3) 
Element Far Req. Failure Met Category 
Fuel Quantity 
DAAS Map Sensor 
DAAS RPM Sensor 
Wing Flp. Pos. Sens. 
OK Cat 2 
N/A 
N/A 
N/A 
Elev. Trim Pos. Sens. OK 
Cowl Flps. Pos. Sens. N/A 
LDG Gear Pos. Sens. N/A 
Door Pos. Sens. N/A 
Aux. Fuel Pump Sw. N/A 
Cws-Switch & Logic OK 
Go-Around Switch N/A 
Pitch Trim Switch N/A 
Pitch Trim Button 
A/P Dump Sw. & Relay 
Co-Pilot Comm. 
Transievers, Antennas 
Co-Pilot Comm. 
Transievers, Antennas 
N/A 
OK 
OK 
OK 
Pilot Nav. 
Receiver + Antennas OK Cat 2 
Co-Pilot Nav. 
Receiver + Antennas 
DME Receiv. + Ant. 
Transponder + Ant. 
Audio Headsets 
Switch Nav 1 Sel. 
Switch Nav 2 Sel. 
Switch DME Sel. 
Swi tch VOR Sel. 
Switch Loc/GS Sel. 
IDCC Keyboard 
IDCC Selector Switch 
IDCC CPU, Display 
EHSI Selector Switch 
OK Cat 2 
OK Cat 2 
N/A 
OK 
N/A 
N/A 
N/A 
N/A 
N/A 
N/A 
N/A 
N/A 
N/A 
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2 
1 
1 
1 
1 
1 
1 
1 
1 
3 
3 
2 
3 
3 
1 
1 
2 
1 
2 
1 
2 
2 
2 
2 
1 
2 
3 
2 
2 
2 
Comments 
Redundant info. available 
A Software Controlled 
CWS Light Recommended 
Runaway Not Monitored 
2 Failures Probab. _10- 7 
Duplex Probab. "_10- 6 
Single DME 
No Outsignal ATC Problem! 
DAAS Duplex 
Missed Pilot Input Check. 
Low Probability 
-, 
Failure 
No. 
61 
62 
63 
64 
65 
66 
67 
68 
69 
70 
71 
72 
73 
74 
75 
76 
77 
78 
79 
80 
81 
82 
83 
84 
85 
86 
Table 2-4. Summary of the DAAS Failure Modes and 
Effects Analysis (Sheet 3 of 3) 
Element Far Req. Met 
EHSI CPU, Display N/A 
Annunciator Panel OK 
Mode Cont. Trim/Hdg. OK 
Mode Cont. Toggle Sw. OK 
Mode Cont. Solen. Sw. OK 
A/P Yaw Clutch, Servo OK 
A/P Roll Clutch Servo OK 
A/P Pitch Clut. Servo OK 
A/P Pitch Trim Servo OK 
Clutches Common Logic OK 
A/P-I/O CPU, BIM 
A/P-I/O A/D, D/A, MUX NOT OK 
NAV/FLT PLN CPU, BIM 
Spare CPU, BIM 
Radio Adapter Box 
and BIM 
Dabs Transponder 
CPU + BIM 
BUS. Controller 
CPU, BIM 
488 Bus 
EEPROM Memory 
Cassette 
A/C Main 28 VDC Bus 
Avionics 28VDC Bus 
DAAS A-B 28VDC Bus. 
DAAS AC Buses 
DAAS 15V DC Bus 
DAAS 12 DC Bus 
DAAS 5 DC Bus 
NOT OK 
N/A 
N/A 
N/A 
NOT OK 
NOT OK 
NOT OK 
NOT OK 
OK 1) 
OK 
NOT OK 
NOT OK 
NOT OK 
NOT OK 
NOT OK 
Failure 
Category 
2 
2 
2 
2 
2 
2 
3 
3 
3 
3 
3 
2 
2 
3 
1 
3 
3 
3 
3 
4 
4 
3 
3 
3 
3 
3 
Comments 
Fault During Critical 
Fault Phases 
Probab. No Recon. 30'10- 5 
Probab. Recon. 6'10- 5 
Probab. <10- 6 
Critical Fault Phase 
ATC Problem 
Uncertain Warn. 
Critical Fault Phase 
Probab. <10- 6 (Estimated) 
Efficient Bite Probab. «10- 6 
Probab. <10- 7 
Probab. <10- 7 
Probab. <10- 7 
Probab. _10- 5 
Probab. _10- 5 
Probab. «10- 6 
Probab. -10- 5 
1) CESSNA 402B electrical power system with DAAS installed 
assumed to meet applicable Far requirements. 
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• EEPROM Memory and Cassette 
• The Electrical Power Buses 
The 23.1329(e) conflict was resolved by introducing three hard-
ware limiters located immediately downstream of the pitch, roll 
and yaw A/D converters in the DAAS hardware. These limiters 
prohibit any kind of DAA~ computer failure from commanding servo 
hardover. The limiters reduce any DAAS computer hardover failures 
to: 
• Pitch - 60% Full Scale 
• Roll - 30% Full Scale 
• Yaw - 45% Full Scale 
Appendix A contains the complete Failure Modes and effects 
analyses. Eighty-six failures were defined and categorized 
as follows. 
Category 1 - Failures are negligible to the DAAS pilot; 
copilot instruments, door switches, etc. 
e. g. , 
Category 2 - Failures that cause inconvenience to the DAAS pilot; 
e.g., loss of ADC-380 RMI, a -Sensor, Annunciator 
Panel. 
Category 3 - Failures during busy or critical flight-phases which 
can be demanding to the DAAS pilot; e.g., IDCC key-
board, engine/status instrument, servos, autopilot 
dump switch, autopilot processor, bus, and electric 
power. 
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Category 4 - Failures that may create a critical situation. The 
two DAAS Category 4 failures are loss of the Aircraft 
and Avionics 28-Vdc Bus. The probability of occur-
rence is very remote. 
Table 2-5 summarizes the number of failures that fall within 
these failure categories. 
Table 2-5. Failure Categorization of 
the DAAS Elements 
Failure Category 
1 2 3 4 
Number of DAAS 22 36 26 2 
Elements 
The DAAS Category 4 failures have a very low probability of 10-6 . 
They are negligible. 
Autopilot Processor failures are demanding during especially low 
altitude flight phases. The probability of such a failure may be 
10-5 for a 4-hour flight. It is vital to the DAAS flight safety 
that the copilot closely monitors the DAAS performance during 
such conditions. 
The DAAS FMEA concludes that, with servo command limiters imple-
mented as recommended, DAAS. flight safety is adequate for the 
demonstration system. 
The DAAS system meets the objectives of the program as well as 
the necessary safety requirements. The conclusions and recommen-
dations pertaining to the DAAS system are presented in Section 6 
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report. The DAAS design and analysis served as a baseline for 
the Projected Advanced Avionics System (PAAS), which is discussed 
in the following section. 
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SECTION 3 
PROJECTED ADVANCED AVIONICS SYSTEM (PAAS) 
PAAS is a projected operational version of DAAS. It extrapolates 
the DAAS concept of fault tolerant -integrated avionics to a sys-
tem that could be produced in the mid-1980s. PAAS is designed to 
have super functional reliability. The Autopilot/Navigation mean 
time between loss of function is on the order of 10,000 hours. 
PAAS can thus provide the dependable pilot relief that is essen-
tial for effective flight management by using the expanded func-
tional capabilities provided. 
Following is a description of PAAS and an analysis of its reli-
ability, cost, maintainability, and modularity. 
3.1 PAAS SYSTEM DESCRIPTION 
The PAAS system, Figure 3-1, extrapolates the DAAS concept to a 
mid-1980s projected operational avionics configuration. PAAS 
architecture is similar to DAAS; i.e., it is a reconfigurable 
multiprocessor configuration~ PAAS extends the DAAS spare pro-
cessor redundancy concept to cover all essential avionics pro-
cessors. PAAS employs a fault tolerant sensor configuration, 
dual redundant data busses, and dual autopilot servos. Redun-
dancy in sensors, data bus, and servos -- in addition to fault 
tolerant processing -- is required to cause significant impact 
to the avionics functional reliability. 
PAAS is designed as a minimum cost system that will allow con-
tinued operation of essential avionics functions after any single 
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failure. Functional reliability of navigation and autopilot are 
emphasized. The PAAS design provides approximately 10,000 flight 
hours of operation between loss of these functions, as compared 
to 200 hours for current systems. -PAAS includes extensive built-
in test for high confidence fault detection (and annunciation) 
and fault isolation for efficient maintenance. 
Following is a description of the PAAS fault tolerant implementa-
tion of sensors, data bus, computer, displays, servos, power 
supplies, and the redundancy management techniques envisioned for 
the system. 
3.1.1 PAAS Sensor Configuration 
PAAS sensors required for navigation and autopilot functions are 
redundant for fault tolerance. Four skewed laser gyros, and four 
skewed accelerometers are proposed for the projected strap-down 
attitude heading reference system (AHRS). Dual static and differ-
ential pressure transducers are proposed for air data sensing. 
Dual VOR receivers and single DME are included for NAV inputs. 
Fuel sensors, engine sensors and configuration monitoring sensors 
are nonredundant. 
Following are details on the unique PAAS AHRS and air data sensor 
mechanization. 
3.1.1.1 PAAS AHRS Mechanization -- The AHRS employs strap-down 
skewed laser gyros and skewed accelerometers for fault tolerant 
attitude and rate sensing. 
The laser gyro is a solid-state, preC1S10n angular rate sensor 
with a direct digital output. The laser gyro is ideally suited 
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for strap-down system configurations because it eliminates the 
need for gimbals, torque motors or other rotating parts. Instead 
of the rotating mass of a conventional mechanical gyro, the ring 
laser gyro utilizes two beams of laser light counter-rotating in 
a closed path. Laser gyro based inertial navigation and inertial 
reference systems are inherently more reliable and easy to main-
tain, and they provide the additional benefits of instant on, in-
sensitivity to acceleration error sources, and low life cycle cost. 
Four gyros and four accelerometers are employed in a skewed con-
figuration, as shown in Figure 3-2. 
Aircraft body rates (and accelerations) are derived from the sen-
sor tetrad as indicated. The three body axis rate components 
(and accelerations) can be computed from the sensor signals even 
if one sensor has failed. Fault tolerance is thus provided for 
the three body rates (and accelerations) with only one added 
sensor. 
A faulty sensor can be detected with high confidence by sensor 
comparison monitoring, and the fault can be isolated to one sen-
sor either automatically, or by pilot selection should the auto-
matic selection fail as described in paragraph 3.1.7. 
The sensed aircraft rate and acceleration signals are converted 
to digital form in each of the PAAS dual I/O terminals and trans-
mitted to the PAAS AHRS processor for attitude/heading computa-
tions. A flux gate signal is also input for long term heading 
reference. The attitude heading signals are used on the elec~ 
tronic attitude indicator in the PAAS autopilot and navigation 
functions. 
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A general aviation laser gyro AHRS is not currently available, 
but may become feasible. Honeywell is developing a laser gyro 
inertial reference assembly for the Boeing 767. Others are work-
ing on low cost laser rate sensors using optical fibers. 
3.1.1.2 PAAS Air Data Sensors -- Dual solid state static and 
differential pressure transducers and dual temperature sensors 
are proposed for PAAS to provide fault tolerant inputs for com-
putation of altitude, altitude rate, indicated airspeed and true 
airspeed. Honeywell's solid state transducers used in current 
commercial aircraft air data systems are representative of de-
vices which will likely make the PAAS air data approach feasible 
in general aviation in coming years. 
The Honeywell pressure sensor converts the applied pressure to a 
usable electrical signal. An N-type silicon diaphragm within the 
sensor contains two P-type resistors diffused in an orthogonal 
pattern on the diaphragm. The orthogonal placement of the resist-
ors in the diaphragm creates a change in the bulk resistivity of 
the resistors that is a function of diaphragm tangential and 
radial strain. The trangential resistor (RT) increases resistance 
with strain (applied pressure), while the radial resistor (RR) 
exhibits a corresponding de~rease with strain. 
The silicon piezoresistors are, therefore, used as strain gage 
elements. 
The resistive elements have nearly identical temperature coeffi-
cients of resistance, because they are formed at the same time 
during the processing operations and are adjacent to each other. 
This permits temperature-related errors to be largely self-compen-
sating due to the sensor resistance-bridge circuit mechanization. 
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Sensed static pressure, differential pressure and temperature are 
converted to digital form and transmitted to the PAAS ADC proces-
sor for computation of altitude and airspeed signals for use on 
electronic flight instruments, and in PAAS autopilot and naviga-
tion functions. 
3.1.2 PAAS Data Bus 
The PAAS data bus is dualized for fault tolerance. One bus con-
troller is located with each I/O terminal. The two busses oper-
ate continuously to provide dual redundant inputs to detect (and 
annunciate) faults with high confidence. 
DAAS employs the 16-wire IEEE 488 8-bit parallel data bus. A 
high throughput serial data bus, for which LSIC interface compo-
nents are available, is proposed for PAAS. The serial bus would 
be preferable to minimize aircraft wiring if the PAAS processors 
are packaged separately. 
PAAS data bus throughput requirements have not been established, 
though PAAS data bus loading is clearly higher than DAAS because 
air data, AHRS data, and weather radar display data are added to 
the bus. 
3.1.3 PAAS Computer Architecture 
The PAAS computer employs the spare processor redundancy concept 
developed for DAAS, but extends back-up capability to all essen-
tial processors. See Figure 3-1. The PAAS spare can take over 
for any failed processor except the DABS processor, the weather 
radar processor, or the IDCC processor. 
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The DABS or weather radar function reliability would not be sig-
nificantly enhanced by redundant processing because the higher 
failure rate sensors are not redundant. The IDCC back-up is a 
reversion mode on the EHSI display; thus IDCC processor backup 
is not required. 
The PAAS processors receive their inputs, and supply outputs to 
dual I/O terminals via the dual PAAS data busses. 
3.1.4 PAAS Displays 
Proposed PAAS display configuration is illustrated in Figure 3-3. 
Three-color CRTs are included. One display normally presents: 
• Attitude/Director Indicator 
• lAS Indicator 
• Altimeter 
• Vertical Speed Indicator 
• Etc. 
The second panel mounted display is a horizontal situation indi-
cator similar to the DAAS EHSI. A third display would be mounted 
in the pedestal for use as an IDCC. 
The first display could be periodically switched to present the 
EHSI if the second display failed, and vice versa. The second 
display could also be switched to operate as a primitive NAV 
function IDCC if the primary IDCC failed. 
Multifunction controls are provided for each display. The con-
trols are relabeled when the display function changes. 
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Communication control heads are panel mounted to provide tuning 
capability independent of the PAAS display system. 
3.1.5 PAAS Servo Mechanization 
PAAS servos are dual with clutch arrangements to allow switching 
between servos for continued operation after one servo failure. 
Each servo in a dual pair is driven from one of the dual I/O ter-
minals. A servo model would be implemented in PAAS software for 
each mechanical servo, and model output would be compared to 
servo output to detect and isolate servo faults. 
3.1.6 PAAS Power Mechanization 
Dual, monitored power supplies are included in PAAS. The power 
references to the essential PAAS components are switched in event 
of a power supply failure .. 
3.1.7 PAAS Redundancy Management 
PAAS would include extensive built-in test to detect and isolate 
faults to facilitate automatic reconfiguration. Fault detection 
confidence could exceed 99 percent for dual elements through use 
of simple comparison monitoring. Automatic fault isolation is 
feasible with confidence on the order of 80 to 90 percent for the 
dual sensors, and approaching 100 percent for the dual model-
comparison-monitored servos. 
PAAS could include capability for manual redundancy management as 
backup to the automatic fault localization/reconfiguration. The 
PAAS data bus could be switched manually from dual operation to 
Channel I or Channel II as indicated in Figure 3-3. Sensor and 
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servos could be manually selected on IDCC pages as shown in 
Figure 3-4. 
3.2 PAAS RELIABILITY ANALYSIS 
PAAS is configured to provide an order of magnitude improvement 
in functional reliability at a reasonable cost with respect to 
conventional architectures. Effectiveness of the PAAS architecture 
is therefore analyzed by comparing PAAS Autopilot and Navigation 
function reliability with respect to a hypothesized "conventional" 
system. The reliability analysis also compares the maintenance 
failure rate of PAAS and the "conventional" system to give some 
indication of PAAS relative life cycle cost. 
The "conventional" system component list, and associated failure 
rates, are compiled in Table 3-1. This system includes current 
devices required to give functional capability similar to that of 
PAAS. Communications, navigation, flight control, performance 
computations, configuration monitoring, and weather radar are in-
cluded. Where possible, failure rates are King Radio Corporation 
tabulations of actual operational experience. Honeywell Reliabil-
ity Engineering Group provided generic estimates where operational 
experience was not available. The PAAS computer unit reliability 
prediction is extrapolated from the DAAS hardware mechanizations. 
The "conventional" system maintenance failure rates are summed to 
determine a total failure rate of 1061.5 percent per 1000 hours, 
for a total system mean time between failure of 94 hours. 
The "conventional" system autopilot/navigation functional reli-
ability was determined by summing failure rates of components 
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ADC SEl/cn •••••••••••••••••.•. AUTo/l 
ADC PS/IAS FAil •••.••••••••••••••• X/X 
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Figure 3-4. PAAS Manual Redundancy Management 
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Table 3-1. 
FAILU~E 
R.\f~ 
Reliability Estimate for a Conventional 
System 
H.\ IIf1'ElIANCE AUTO PIWT/NAV 
F.\ILUSE RATE FUtiCTlOII FAII.URE 
Cmffal BUnON RATE CONT&lBUTJON 
._-
DEVICE (4110JO H~S) QU.\NITI'Y (t/IOOO ilKS) ('I./IOJO lias) CU~IM£Nr 
NAV/FI.T WNTWI. 5ENSOI{S/INS'l'RIIHENTS 
Ya\l Jhte Gyro 5. I s. 5. 
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228. 6s. 
(,OHPIiTEa. EI.ECTRO'l1 (,S 
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Flight Comptlter (Kep 320) 85. I 85. 85. 
RNAV 5y.'u", (KNC M.~) 90. I 9.:1. 90. 
VNAV Coollputcr (K~ 395) 45. I 45. 4\. 
PcrfOrlll.1nCe Cump'ltet' 20. I 1.Qs. 
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Table 3-1. Reliability Estimate for a Conventional System (Sheet 2 of 2) 
l! I~!i!.~! _At:TlI/\lof~.:; 
P j h:1I St! rvo 
Roll Sc rvo 
Yaw 'lcrvo 
D~VICE 
Pillh Trim Servo 
illNJX.l!'!.!lli! 
f>L\I' $cnsor 
"PH Sl:I1SlJf 
Cowl nap Position 
Flap l'osltlon 
~lcvator Trim Post ion 
K..IiJdr Altllllcl~r 
i!r:<\'I'IIEIt RADAR 
TromslII i tt~r/Rc(;&! iver 
Displdy lInlt 
!.:!lUt'll.!.t:!IC.ATIO~S 
(;0111'11 'f'-..tnH,tdvcu (KY 190) 
It\IIS l'[".1msponJer 
n.\llS Control/Display 
.11:~(J:I!l~ll..:.-.EQltEJ{ Sri'I'cH 
Ale 2HVO:": Bus. Aircraft l.Ialtcry 
lIe/At: Invertor 
I)C/I>(; Convcrtt:r 
FAILURE 
.,\TE 
(l/lOOO IIRS 
I. 
I. 
I. 
I. 
S. 
0.5 
I. 
.S 
2. 
2. 
SO. 
SO. 
S. 
33. 
40. 
30. 
.,11 
J. 
3. 
QUANTITY 
HAIN'fENANCE 
FAILURE RATE 
CO~RIBUTIOIf 
(t/IO~O !IRS) 
1. 
1. 
I. 
1. 
1.. 
26. 
I. 
2. 
.5 
2. 
2. 
~ 
51.5 
SO. 
.-1.. 
55. 
bo. 
40. 
ll... 
136. 
Nor INCLUDW 
I. 
J. 
4.0 
TOTAl.: 105 •• 5 
HeRF a 94.6 IIRS 
AUTO PIWf/NAV 
FUNCT JON FA 11.URE 
RATE CON'rRIBUrIO~ 
(X/IOOO IIRS) 
I. 
I. 
I. 
I. 
1.. 
26. 
o 
ii 
o 
.01 
I. 
1.-
4.01 
" '6. S\ 
201. IIRS 
cm" ... t1::N'f 
Nul requln~J for Autopilot. NAV llllh.:tiun. 
Not requirt:J for Autopilo:: t ttW (IIOl:llon. 
Not rcq"lrt:d for Autopilot. NAV fUnl'thln. 
~.------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------~ 
J J, 
required to provide these functions. Failure contribution of 
dual VOR receivers was considered negligible. The total conven-
tional syst~m autopilot/navigation function failure rate, assum-
ing a 1-hour mission, is 496.5 percent per 1000 hours for a mean 
time between loss of function of 201 hours. 
Corresponding PAAS maintenance reliability and autopilot/naviga-
tion function reliability are compiled in Table 3-2. PAAS main-
tenance reliability is 50 percent better than the conventional 
system because: 
• High reliability digital electronics employed 
• High reliability solid state sensor technology employed 
~ Electronic displays replace conventional instruments 
• PAAS integrated avionics architecture eliminates hardware 
PAAS autopilot/navigation function reliability is improved by a 
factor of 50 with respect to the "conventional" system, primarily 
due to the fault tolerant PAAS architecture. A PAAS gyro, accel-
erometer or air data sensor failure can be tolerated without loss 
of a function. A PAAS processor failure, a power supply failure, 
and a servo failure can be tolerated without loss of function. 
This PAAS fault tolerance is accomplished with the minimum of 
redundant hardware, as described in section 3.1. 
PAAS would suffer gross loss of function for certain failure com-
binations. For example,the PAAS configuration would be totally 
incapacitated by two like bus controller failures. The probabil-
ity of such failures occurring during a 1-hour flight is extremely 
low, however; for example: 
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Table 3-2. 
D~VICE 
NAV/FI.T CONTROL SENSORS 
M.tgenetic Transmitter (KMT 112) 
1 .. 1St!r Gyro, Intt!dace Electronics 
Acct!len)&uctt:r. Interface Electronic8 
PUot System. Left 
PUot System, Right 
Slat Ie Pressure Transducer 
Dit fcrt:nt 1a 1 Pressure Transducer 
VOR Receiver (KN ~) 
DflE Recol ye r (KN 62A) 
Angle of Attack Sensur 
OAT Sensor 
CONTtWI.S AND DISrl.AYS 
Autopilot HoJe Controller (.alC 340) 
tADl Display. Controls 
EWa Display. Controls 
Jlx:C, Display, Controls 
C()fIl·UT~R. ~I.EGTR()NICS 
Prucessor (8086. Mt!lIlory) 
A/D, U/A, MUX 
UuM)lc Memory System 
'!!~\!Q...~ 
IIi h:h Servo 
KC'lll St! rvo 
Your Servo 
l'ttL:h Trim Servo 
FAILURE 
RAl'E 
(7./1000 IIRS) 
2. 
S. 
S. 
S. 
S. 
S. 
S. 
2S. 
SO. 
S. 
2. 
34. 
3S. 
3S. 
3S. 
6. 
6. 
50. 
1. 
1. 
1. 
5. 
Reliability Estimate for PAAS 
QUANTITY 
4 
4 
II 
HAINTEIlANCE 
FAILURE RATE 
COIITRIBUTIOII 
(1/1000 liftS) 
2. 
20. 
20. 
5. 
5. 
10. 
10. 
50. 
50. 
5. 
-1... 
119. 
34. 
35. 
)S. 
....ll.. 
139. 
66. 
12. 
2Q.. 
128. 
14. 
14. 
14. 
10. 
52.' 
AUTO PILOT/IIAV 
FUNCTION FAILURE 
RATE CONTRIBUTION 
(1/1000 liftS) 
O. 
2. 
2. 
.5 
• S 
1. 
I. 
O. 
.-.! 
1.1 
o 
o 
o 
Q 
o 
1.8 
• 6 
o 
2.4 
o 
o· 
o 
o 
'0 
CmlllENT 
HanualfPK{J°t12 ~:1t!~g aligmucnt rClluircd 
90t fault hulat ion capabi IHy a~:UHIIlk.: .... 
901 fault isolation capabUiLy assun~J. 
90l. fault holation ~apability <.ISSIIIIk.:d. 
901. fault 15ull:ltivn 1.3Vabi tHy as~ulll ... d • 
~l fault isulation capability .H'6UII.l,:J. 
90t fault ho1ation <:ap.abll1ty assull.eJ. 
Manual switching if rt:qulr~i.I. 
901 fault isal.H tun <:apabilitv .JSSU,llfo!J. 
IDCC pagt! for ba~kup. 
Manual 5wttdllng o( dhplays. 
Manual swltl,;hing uf displaYIi. 
Battle NAV p.lge avallabh on ElISI displays. 
Autopilot, NAV, AOC. AIIRS. RAU, Hus Controller 
procc~Hiors only. 9S'%. faliit isol.:Jt Ion 
capabiltiy assuwmed. 
951 fault iS601ation capability a~StllulllcJ • 
Not rcqui red uDless another (a' lure OI..'CU[S. 
Servo-mo.J~l <:owparlson ulonitLring for 
Cault halation. 
S~rvo-lHodel COllillarison .Ionitoring ,,"" 
fault holation. 
Servo-model cUltlparltWD mon.torlng ft11,· 
fault isolat iOD. 
Servu-model cOUlparhon lUon'torlll~ tor 
fault isolation. 
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o 
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Table 3-2. 
DEVIC~ 
!!'.lli!.!Q!!.2.~li~~ 
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RPH 
Cowl nap Position 
Flap 1'05 it ion 
Elc'Jator 1'n .. l)u'H j Ion 
Radar Altin~ter (KC 221) 
~~~ 
'fran.; .. ,' tter/lt~cl! avcr 
.!X~'!' 11!1l :;~:~t·l'~ ~ 
CUl,'II' Tr:msce (vcrs (KY 196) 
11\8:) Tr.lnspn.Jo,..!( 
.E.Gr;lL:.~~·~ll'~~ _!I.ft: ~f! 
Ale: l8V')',' IIU:1, .\ i. rcr .. ~t 1!.I:.:.ery 
PAAS Battery 
Laser Gyro Power SUPllly 
OC/l)l.~ Converter 
Reliability Estimate for PAAS (Sheet 2 of 2) 
FAILURE 
RA'rE 
(1./10)0 IIRS) 
o.~ 
I. 
. ~ 
2. 
2. 
~J. 
'jOe 
lJ. 
~.). 
• 01 
10. 
1. 
1. 
QUANTI1Y 
tlAlNTENANCE 
FAILURE RATE 
CON1'RIBI!f)ON 
(7./ 1000 IIRS) 
1. 
2. 
.5 
2. 
2. 
2Q.L 
57.5 
1lh 
50. 
66. 
1:h 
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NOr INCLUDED 
10. 
1. 
6. 
17. 
TOUL: 128.5 
!ffBF • 137 HRS 
AUTO PILOT/HAV 
FUNCTION FAILURE 
kATE CONTRI BU'flON 
(t/IO')') lIRS) 
o 
.J 
.01 
o 
1. 
......L 
l.ll 
10.8 
9260 ilKS 
CmttE'f 
Nut required for Au[ojltlu.:. NAV llln-.:liun. 
Not req'Jircd fo(" Autopilot, NAV fURl.'tion. 
Pilot dt'jcng .... :.!u •. :nl. J~! b.': !I'V ·1;;;I.I,U" ' • 
PAAS le:il~n .. uu.t ol,cratc wilhout b.llt':l"Y. 
95% fault ist.llat ton ..:ap.lbi 1 tty a:,:,ulUcJ .. 
Dual Failure Probability = (ABC t)2 = 1 x 10-8 
where: 
ABC = bus controller failure rate = 10%/1000 hours 
t = time = 1 hour 
The two-failure probability is similar to the order of magnitude 
of Military aircraft fly-by-wire flight control catastrophic 
failure rate. 
3.3 PAAS COST ANALYSIS 
PAAS and "conventional" system cost estimates, compiled in Tables 
3-3 and 3-4, indicate that the PAAS costs are similar to those 
for a conventional system. 
The cost figures used in the analysis were current King Radio 
catalog prices where available, or rough estimates based on simi-
larity where catalog prices were not available. The PAAS com-
puter cost estimate is an approximation extrapolated from the 
DAAS hardware mechanization. No estimate is available for the 
PAAS laser gyro AHRS, so a cost number corresponding to an electro-
mechanical device was used. Conclusions are not affected even if 
this number is significantly increased. 
PAAS thus provides dramatic improvements in functional reliability 
without significantly increasing system costs. PAAS total costs 
are contained because PAAS is integrated and does not require 
dedicated controls and displays for its functions. 
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Table 3-3. Cost Estimate for a Conventional System 
Device 
NAV/FLT Control Sensors 
Yaw Rate Gyro 
Magnetic Transmitter (KMT 112) 
Directional Gyro (KSG 105) 
Slave Control (KA 51A) 
Vertical Gyro (VG 208) 
Pitot System, Left 
Pitot System Right 
Encoding Altimeter (IDC 571) 
Air Data Computer (KDC 380) 
VOR Receiver (KN 53) 
DME Receiver (KN 62A) 
Angle of Attack Sensor, Ind. 
Turn and Bank 
OAT Sensor 
Subtotal 
Controls and .Displays 
Autopilot Mode Controller 
(KMC 340) 
Autopilot Annunciator Panel 
(KAP 315) 
ADI (KCI 310) 
HSI (KPI 553) 
RMI (KI 226) 
Audio Control Panel (KMA 24) 
Airspeed Indicator 
Artificial Horizon (KG 253) 
Subtotal 
Computer, Electronics 
Autopilot Computer (KAC 325) 
Flight Computer (KCP 320) 
RNAV System (KNC 665) 
VNAV Computer (KVN 395) 
Performance Computer 
Subtotal 
Estimated 
Quantity Cost 
107 
1 
1 
1 
1 
1 
1 
1 
1 
1 
2 
1 
1 
1 
1 
1 
1 
1 
1 
1 
1 
1 
1 
1 
1 
1 
1 
1 
(Dollars) 
1,200 
205 
2,495 
60 
4,303 
4,629 
1,785 
3,730 
3,225 
2,566 
700 
100 
24,998 
885 
520 
5,610 
7,200 
2,205 
675 
170 
1,250 
18,515 
3,035 
4,465 
5,985 
3,305 
14,200 
30,990 
Basis For 
Estimate 
Catalog 
Catalog 
Catalog 
Catalog 
Catalog 
Catalog 
Catalog 
Catalog 
Catalog 
Catalog 
Catalog 
Estimate Only 
Catalog 
Catalog 
Catalog 
Catalog 
Catalog 
Catalog 
Catalog 
Catalog 
Catalog 
Catalog 
Catalog 
Catalog 
Catalog 
Table 3-3. Cost Estimate for a Conventional System (Sheet 2 of 2) 
Estimated Basis For Device Quantity Cost Estimate (Dollars) 
Servo Actuators 
Pitch Servo 1 2,140 Catalog 
Roll Servo 1 2,140 Catalog 
Yaw Servo 1 2,140 Catalog 
Pitch Trim Servo 1 1,665 Catalog 
Subtotal 8,085 
Moni toring: 
Failure Annunciator 1 75 Estimate Only 
MAP Sensor 2 200 Estimate Only 
RPM Sensor 2 1,200 Estimate Only 
Cowl Flap Position 1 100 Estimate Only 
Flap Position 1 100 Estimate Only 
Elevator Trim Position 1 100 EStimate Only 
Radar Altimeter 1 2 z350 Catalog 
Subtotal 4,~25 
Weather Radar 
Transmitter/Receiver 1 13,000 Split Estimate 
Display Unit 1 7,000 
Subtotal 20,000 
Communications 
Comm Tranceivers (KY 196) 2 3,510 Catalog 
DABS Transponder 1 2,000 Estimate Only 
DABS Control/Display 1 4,000 Estimate Only 
Subtotal 9,510 
TOTAL $116,223 
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Table 3-4. Cost Estimate for PAAS 
Estimated Basis For Device Quantity Cost Estimate (Dollars) 
NAVLFLT Control Sensors 
Magnetic Transmitters 1 205 Catalog 
(KMT 112) 
Laser Gyro, Interface 8,000 Estimated of 
Electronics basis of cost 
Accelerometer, Interface of electromechan-
Electronics ical replacement 
Pitot System, Left 
Pitot System, Right 
Static Pressure Transducer 2 800 Estimate Only 
Differential Pressure 2 800 Estimate Only 
VOR Receiver (KN 53) 2 3,730 Catalog 
DME Receiver (KN 62A) 1 3,225 Catalog 
Angle-of-Attack Sensor 1 828 Catalog 
OAT Sensor 1 100 Catalog 
,,:--- Subtotal 17,688 
Controls and Displals 
Autopilot Mode Controller 1 885 Catalog 
(KMC 340) 
EADI Display, Controls 1 7,000 Estimate On·ly 
EHSI Display, Controls 1 7,000 Estimate Only 
IDCC, Display, Controls 1 8 1 000 Estimate Only Subtotal 22,885 
ComEuter, Electronics 
Processor (8086, Memory) 11 9,600 Estimate Only 
Power Supply and Misc. 6,000 Estimate Only 
AID, DIA, MIX 2 2,000 Estimate Only 
Bubble Memory System 1 2,000 Estimate Only 
Subtotal 19,600 
..--. 
Servo Actuators 
Pitch Servo 2 4,280 Catalog 
Roll Servo 2 4,280 Catalog 
Your Servo 2 4,280 Catalog 
Pitch Trim Servo 2 3.330 Catalog 
Subtotal 16,170 
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Table 3-4. Cost Estimate for PAAS (Sheet 2 of 2) 
Device 
Monitor Sensors 
MAP 
RPM 
Cowl Flap Position 
Flap Position 
Elevator Trim Position 
Radar Altimeter (RT 221) 
Subtotal 
Weather Radar 
Transmitter/Receiver 
Subtotal 
Communications 
Comm Transceivers (KY 196) 
DABS Transponder 
Subtotal 
TOTAL 
Estimated 
Quantity Cost 
2 
2 
1 
1 
1 
1 
2 
1 
110 
(Dollars) 
200 
1,200 
100 
100 
100 
2,350 
4,050 
13,000 
13,000 
3,510 
2,000 
5,510 
$98,903 
Basis For 
Estimate 
Estimate Only 
Estimate Only 
Estimate Only 
Estimate Only 
Estimate Only 
Catalog 
Transceiver/display 
Split Estimate 
Catalog 
Estimate Only 
3.4 PAAS MAINTAINABILITY ANALYSIS 
The projected advanced Avionics System (PAAS) maintenance test 
concept is depicted in Figure 3-5. Highly effective avionics 
built-in test (BIT) is anticipated. On-aircraft functional test-
ing and fault localization to a module within an LRU are expected 
to be feasible with minimal test equipment. The fixed base oper-
ator could exploit the BIT capability and minimize his special 
purpose test equipment and become more a storehouse of replace-
able modules. The avionics should include capability for on-
aircraft trouble shooting by the fixed base operator. Faulty 
modules could be repaired at the factory. 
BIT design objectives consistent with the above maintenance phil-
osophy are: 
• Minimize fixed base operator test capability requirements 
• Maximize BIT fault localization capability 
Of course, the resulting BIT mechanization must not significantly 
inc~ease avionics cost. 
DAAS BIT modes include: 
• In-flight test 
• Functional test/fault localization - automatic 
• Functional test/fault localization - interactive 
• Maintenance trouble shooting 
In-flight-test is continuous and will generate a warning when a 
detected failure will disable a system function. The DAAS will 
automatically reconfigure for computer unit processor failures. 
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ON AIRCRAFT MAINTENANCE 
• FUNCTIONAL TESTING - 95% CONFIDENCE 
• FAULT LOCALIZATION TO LRU - 90% CONFIDENCE 
• FAULT LOCALIZATION TO REPLACEABLE MODULE-
80 - 90% CONFIDENCE 
• TESTING, TROUBLESHOOTING VIA IDCC 
FIXED BASE OPERATOR 
• ON AIRCRAFT MAINTENANCE 
• LIMITED GENERAL PURPOSE TEST EaUIPMENT 
• REPLACEABLE MODULE STOCK 
• LRU STOCK -- (LINE REPLACEABLE UNIT) 
DEPOT/FACTORY 
• MODULE, LRU ATE 
• STANDARD LRU ATE BUS INTERFACE 
• MODULE, LRU REPAIR 
• SPARE PARTS STOCK 
Figure 3~5. PAAS Maintenance Concept 
In-flight failures that are detected by BIT will cause the amber 
warning light to flash. A message will be displayed on the IDCC 
on the line reserved for warning messages. The message will be, 
"Device Failure"· followed by identification of the. failed device. 
(Vertical Gyro, Compass, etc.). 
Functional Test/Fault Localization, Automatic, is performed at 
power-up, or when commanded by the ,operator, and tests system 
components as feasible without operator interaction. This test 
function exercises DAAS equipment and identifies failed LRUs as 
well as failed modules within the LRU as feasible. 
Functional Test/Fault Localization, Interactive, is performed on 
command and allows testing of devices where operator actions or 
observations are necessary to complete a test. IDCC and EHSI 
test pattern tests are included in DAAS as examples of avionics 
interactive testing. 
Maintenance trouble shooting allows the operator to apply signals 
and measure signals via IDCC. Memory words can be displayed. 
Analog and discrete signals ~an be applied at computer outputs, 
and various system analog and discrete signals can be measured 
and displayed. 
Fault localization and replacement of a faulty avionics line re-
placeable unit can be accomplished in mean time of 15 minutes 
with the level of BIT envisioned for PAAS. Repair of a faulty 
unit, i.e., fault localization and replacement of a faulty part, 
can be accomplished in mean time of 1 hour. 
PAAS packaging must be designed to allow operator removal of 
hardware modules and continued operation with only partial loss 
of function. 
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3.5 PAAS MODULARITY ANALYSIS 
PAAS is designed to be modular. The system is constructed of 
building blocks that can be configured to provide varying levels 
of functional capability depending on user requirements. The 
design is intended to facilitate addition of functions without 
major upheaval to the existing aircraft control panel or existing 
avionics. 
Modularity is achieved through: 
~ System architecture 
• Controls and displays modularity 
• Hardware modularity 
• Software modularity. 
Basic system architecture, i.e., multimicroprocessors inter-
connected via data bus, supports modularity. Functions can be 
added by adding appropriate process or modules, and the process-
ing can interface to the system through the data bus. 
PAAS employs programmable controls and displays that can be re-
configured for various functional complements. The IDCC includes 
basic mechanical controls (keyboard page callup buttons, etc.) 
and a programmable display. The basic display module is the dis-
play page. The page can be used as a function control panel or 
for required data and information input/output. The EHSI and 
EADI are displays that can be programmed for the set of functions 
included in a particular PAAS installation. 
PAAS hardware is modular. Standard modules can be added to pro-
vide computing power, memory, or I/O required for added functions. 
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PAAS software is structured and modular. Each of the hardware 
modules are programmed with independent software modules that 
require minimum interfaces with other functions. These software 
modules are developed using structured design techniques. The 
system modularity has been demonstrated by addition of the DABS 
function. 
The integration of DABS into DAAS late in the DAAS development 
program demonstrates basic modularity. Incorporation of DABS 
required --
~ Installing a DABS transponder in the aircraft, and interfac-
ing it to the DAAS computer unit. 
• Adding a DABS processor module, including software, and two 
DABS interface electronics modules to the DAAS computer unit. 
• Adding three DABS pages to the IDCC. 
• Adding a DABS "Message Pending" light to the panel. 
The DAAS processor module is appropriate for DABS computations. 
DAAS keyboard and IDCC page formats are appropriate for DABS. 
Consequently, DABS readily fit into the DAAS framework. PAAS 
modularity is further assessed in the following paragraphs. 
3.5.1 PAAS System Modularity 
PAAS system modularity is demonstrated in Figure 3-6. The vari-
ous levels of functional capability are depicted. The core PAAS 
functional entity is the autopilot. 
The autopilot processor and a basic I/O terminal are required for 
this function. 
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PAAS FUNCTIONAL LEVELS 
D 1 AUTOPILOT 
.2 AIR DATA FUNCTION 
~ 3 AHRS. ADI fUNCTIONS 
1:::::::::::14 NAV. EHSI. IDCC fUNCTIONS 
ffiIIlIIIlII5 DABS . 
~ 6 WEATHER RADAR 
~ 7 fAULT TOLERANT CAPABILITY 
SERVO SET 1 '~SERVOSETZ 
OTHER OTHER 
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•• ~.~ .•• I.C .~. 
Figure 3-6. PAAS Modularity 
A second version of PAAS could include the autopilot and the 
air data functions. In this version, the air data function would 
only supply references for the autopilot. Altimeter and lAS data 
sources would be independent. 
A third version of PAAS could have autopilot, air data, AHRS, and 
the electronic ADI that includes the altimeter, lAS and VSI dis-
plays. 
A fourth version could also include the NAV, EHSl and IDCC 
functions. 
A fifth version could have DABS added, and a sixth version could 
include weather radar data superimposed on the EHSI. 
A seventh version could include the necessary redundant hardware 
for fault tolerant operation. 
Each version of PAAS would be complimented by systems necessary 
for desired functional capability and backup. A particular ver-
sion of PAAS could include spare room to allow incorporation of 
some additional capability: either the defined next higher level, 
or a yet-to-be-defined advanced capability. 
3.5.2 PAAS Controls and Displays Modularity 
The ideal controls and display configurations from a modularity 
standpoint, would include only general purpose controls. No con-
trols dedicated to a specific function would be allowed in order 
to minimize impact on panel hardware when a function was added. 
In an idealized PAAS configuration, controls would include a 
general purpose keyboard, and one IDCC page callup button for 
each function. 
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DAAS has deviated from this ideal in certain respects: 
• Various dedicated NAV function controls are implemented 
above the IDCC, included with page call-up buttons; i.e., 
USE, CRS, SEL, LAT DIR TO, AUTO CRS SEQ. 
~ Dedicated map control buttons are implemented next to the 
IDCC; i.e., HDG/NOR, MAP/CRSR, MAP RTN, WP BRG, REVU, MAP 
SCALE. 
• Dedicated autopilot mode controller, annunciator panel. 
• Other function controls 
These dedicated function controls were implemented to maximize 
their accessibility. 
Dedicated NAV function controls could be avoided if these controls 
were instead implemented in IDCC pages. The penalty for elimina-
tion of dedicated NAV function buttons is as follows: 
• One additional button push required to activate LAT DIR TO. 
• One additional button push required to change waypoint data 
access from linked waypoint, to unlinked waypoint. 
The advantage of this approach, in addition to improved modularity, 
is elimination of dedicated NAV function buttons above the IDCC, 
which leaves only page call-up buttons there. This eases system 
comprehension. 
Current dedicated map control buttons do not significantly degrade 
modularity. They can be an integral part of the EHSI assembly. 
Spare control buttons should be included, however, for additional 
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functions which use the EHSI, which will also have dedicated con-
trols; e.g., weather radar. 
The PAAS Autopilot mode controller is a dedicated panel. Acces-
sibility to the safety critical mode controller seems to preclude 
its incorporation into multifunction control facilities such as 
the IDCC. The autopilot mode annunciator panel would likely be 
incorporated into the EADI if EADI were included in PAAS. 
3.5.3 PAAS Hardware Modularity 
The existing· DAAS hardware is modular. The basic hardware build-
ing block is the processor board, Figure 3-7. This 6.25 by 6.25 
inch printed circuit board includes: 
• INTEL 8086 l6-bit microprocessor 
• 2K x 16 PROM Memory 
• 4K x 16 RAM Memory 
• Crystal clock 
• IEEE 488 bus talker/listener/controller 
• Interrupt controller 
If more than 4K x 16 memory is required for a particular PAAS 
processor, a supplemental 6.25 by 6.25 inch memory board is used. 
This memory board can contain up to 12K x 16 additional RAM 
memory. Other hardware modules that could be employed in a PAAS 
system include: 
• EADI, EHSI display refresh memory module 
• Bubble memory module 
• Analog/Discrete I/O modules 
1~9 
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PAAS would employ a higher level of circuit integration than the 
existing DAAS system. Custom VLSIC would be economical for PAAS 
for the basic hardware modules. Exploiting modularity of a pro-
duction version of PAAS requires the following hardware design 
considerations: 
G The PAAS computer box must have sufficient room and external 
connector pin capacity to support eventual growth. 
e Power supply - The PAAS power supply must have reserve capac-
ity to support eventual system growth or else the power sup-
ply must be changed as functions are added. 
• Data bus throughput - The PAAS data bus must have sufficient 
throughput margin to support eventual system growth. The 
current system IEEE 488 bus is only 30 percent loaded, which 
is consistent with this requirement. The PAAS data bus 
would require higher throughput to accommodate the AHRS and 
weather radar functions. 
3.5.4 PAAS Software Modularity 
PAAS software must be modular. Functions are implemented in 
software modules; i.e., independent programs with single entry 
and exit, separate data locations and clearly defined and con-
trolled interfaces. Data bus communications are managed in an 
orderly fashion by the bus control processor, with growth in mind. 
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SECTION 4 
FABRICATION AND FLIGHTIVORTHINESS TEST RESULTS 
Fabrication of the DAAS central computer, IDCC and EHSI was com-
pleted in November 1980. System integration began on this date and 
concluded in March 1981. System debug and test was performed 
according to standard Honeywell test procedures. Each card and 
software module was testing to the extent practical. System ele-
ments were systematically integrated and tested. As a final func-
tional test, a simplified aircraft simulation was included in the 
DAAS software. This simulator allowed for a complete functional 
test of the hardware and software. Flight scenarios similar to 
that described in Section 2 of this report were flown using the 
autopilot and evaluated. This simulation capability was retained 
for the flight test configuration because of it value as a training 
aid. 
In late March 1981, the DAAS system was subjected to the flight-
worthiness test procedure defined in Honeywell Document W0488-FWT-02. 
This procedure included environmental tests of low temperature at 
altitude, -20°C, 15,000 feet; high temperature at altitude, +50oC, 
15,000 feet and vibration. The Radio Adapter Unit having undergone 
testing at King Radio, was not subjected to these environmental 
tests. 
As detailed in the test plan, each device separately received one 
sine wave vibration scan in each of the three principal axis from 
5 Hz to 500 Hz to 5 Hz. The vibration amplitudes were .01 inches 
DA from 5 to 32 Hz and 0.5 g peak from 32 to 500 Hz for the IDCC 
and the EHSI. The CCU received 1.5 g peak from 55 to 500 Hz with 
the same double amplitude at low frequencies. 
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All of the system components manufactured by Honeywell, Inc. 
performed within the specifications defined by the flightworthi-
ness environmental test procedure. 
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SECTION 5 
INSTALLATION AND FLIGHT TEST 
The installation and flight test of the DAAS was accomplished at 
the King Radio Flight Operations facility in Olathe, Kansas, from 
December, 1980 through November, 1981. 
The equipment was installed by an FAA approved designated altera-
tion station. Flight testing was done under the guidance of FAA 
designated engineering representatives. Prior to first flight the 
aircraft was inspected by a NASA aircraft inspector. 
5.1 INSTALLATION 
The installation work began in December, 1980 when the NASA 402B 
aircraft was delivered'to King Radio. Initially, work efforts were 
directed at the removal of any existing equipment that interfered 
with the DAAS installation. Work on the harness was begun. 
Mechanical engineers reviewed the servo installation requirements 
and designed new brackets. A preliminary control panel was cut to 
allow a fit check using mockup equipment. The engine. control 
switches were moved overhead to allow access by either pilot. 
The actual installation of equipment started in April, 1981 when 
the bench testing was completed at Honeywell and the hardware was 
shipped to King Radio. Installation was completed in May, 1981 and 
the aircraft was released for ground test. 
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5.2 FLIGHT TEST 
5.2.1 Flight Test Schedule 
The flight test schedule is shown in Figure 5-1. 
The flight test plan divided the work into three phases: 
Phase A - Ground Checks 
Phase B - Shakedown and Autopilot Certification 
Phase C - DAAS Evaluation and Acceptance 
The test plan was written to allow as much tasting of DAAS functions 
on the ground as was possible. Table 5-1 is a matrix showing which 
DAAS functions were tested in each phase. 
SCHEDULE MAY JUNE JULY AUG SEPT OCT NOV 
INSTALLATION 
GROUND TEST 
PREFLIGHT INSPECTION ~~ 
SHAKEDOWN FLIGHTS 
"CERTIFICATION" FLTS 
DAAS EVALUATION FL TS. --A. 
Figure 5-1. Flight Test Schedule 
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Table 5-1, DAAS Flight Test Matrix 
DAAS Functions: 
Autopilot 
Yaw Damper 
HOG SEL (Heading Select) 
ALT, ALT ARM (Altitude Hold, Altitude Arm) 
NAV, VNAV Coupled Control 
Approach Coupled Control 
Navigation/Flight Planning 
VOR, VOR/DME Radio Navigation 
10 Waypoints, 10 NAVAID Storage 
Moving Map Display 
VNAV (Vertical Navigation) 
Flight Warning/Advisory System 
Engine Parameter Monitoring, Warning 
Aircraft Configuration Monitoring, Warning 
Ground Proximity Monitoring, Warning 
Airspeed and Stall Monitoring, Warning 
Altitude Advisory Function 
Marker Beacon Advisory Function 
NAVAID Identification Monitoring, Warning 
Autopilot/FIt. Director Monitoring, Warning 
BIT Fault Warning 
GMT Clock Function 
Fuel Totalizer Function 
Weight and Balance Computations 
Performance Computations 
Takeoff Performance 
Cruise Performance 
Fuel/Distance Time Computations 
DABS (Discrete Address Beacon System) 
BlT (Built in Test) 
Normal, Emergency Checklists 
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Phase A 
X 
X 
X 
X 
X 
X 
X 
X 
X 
X 
X 
X 
X 
X 
X 
X 
X 
X 
X 
X 
X 
X 
X 
X 
X 
Phase B 
X 
X 
X 
X 
X 
X 
X 
X 
X 
X 
Phase C 
x 
X 
X 
X 
X 
X 
X 
X 
X 
X 
X 
X 
X 
X 
X 
X 
X 
X 
X 
X 
X 
X 
X 
X 
5.2.2 Ground Test 
Ground tests were conducted using ramp generators and o~her test 
equipment to simulate aircraft flight conditions. Twenty-nine 
individual tests were conducted. These tests are tabulated in 
Table 5-2. 
Table 5-2. Individual Ground Tests 
1. Initial System Setup 
2. Compass/Directional Gyro 
3. Attitude Indicator and Vertical Gyro 
4. Flight Director 
5. Commanded Built-In Test 
6. Heading Select Mode 
7. Go Around Mode 
8. Altitude Hold 
9. Trim Modes 
10. NAVAID Data Entry 
11. Waypoint Data Entry 
12. Nav Radio Tuning 
13. Nav Mode 
14. VNAV Mode 
15. Altitude Arm 
16. Approach Mode 
17. Pitch Axis Autopilot 
18. Roll Axis Autopilot. 
19. Yaw Axis Autopilot 
20. Manual and Auto Pitch Trim 
21. Autopilot/Yaw Damper Disengage Logic 
22. EHSI Map Display 
23. Flight Warning/Advisory System 
24. Weight and Balance Calculations 
25. Performance Calculations 
26. Checklists and Emergency Procedures 
27. CommRadios and Audio System 
28. Altimeters and AOA 
29. Airframe and Engine 
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5.2.3 Shakedown Flights 
The shakedown flights were required to check overall aircraft con-
ditions and to perform a functional scan of all modes and equipment. 
The aircraft had not been flown for seven months and therefore its 
condition was not known. The attitude hold, heading hold, altitude 
hold and nav systems were checked with the flight director; 
approach modes were similarly checked. Problems were investigated 
and corrected. The autopilot was engaged when it was determined 
to be safe. The servo torques and rates were adjusted to the levels 
required to properly fly the aircraft. 
5.2.4 "Certification" Flights 
The "certification" flights verified that the autopilot could safely 
fly the aircraft and that it could not (in any mode or due to any 
failure) jeopardize the safety of the aircraft. Table 5-3 provides 
the list of malfunctions tested. Table 5-4 lists the twenty-six 
flight conditions where the malfunctions were done. The manual 
trim system was also tested to verify safe operation in all con-
ditions. No attempt was made to actually obtain a supplemental 
type certificate for the DAAS. 
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Hard Down 
Hard Down 
Hard Down 
Hard Down 
Hard Down 
Hard Down 
Table 5-3. Malfunctions Tested 
Single Axis 
Hard Left Aileron 
Hard Right Aileron 
Hard Left Rudder 
Hard Right Rudder 
Hard Up Elevator 
Hard Down Elevator 
Hard Up Autotrim 
Hard Down Autotrim 
Multiple Axis 
Elev. Hard Left Aileron 
Elev. Right 
Elev. Right 
Elev. Left 
Elev. Right 
Elev. Left 
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Hard Left Rudder 
Right 
Left 
Left 
Right 
Right 
5.2.5 Evaluation Flights 
The flight test program was flown by King Radio test pilot 
Lloyd Bingham with periodic flights by NASA Project Pilot, 
Gordon Hardy. Approximately seventy hours were flown during 
the program. The program finished with flight demonstrations 
to industry conducted at King Radio, Olathe, Kansas from November 
9 through November 17. Fifteen pilots have flown the aircraft 
to date and the overall evaluations have been favorable. Tables 
5-5 and 5-6 tabulate some of the comments received on the system. 
Many of the discussions after the flight centered on the functions 
which could be implemented in an integrated system. A built-in 
simulation mode was included for troubleshooting and software 
debug. This function was left in the system for pilot training. 
The major problem during demonstrations was to minimize pilot 
headdown time and to keep from overloading the pilot with too 
much data. 
Table 5-4~ Airworthiness Testing 
AC 
Condition Trim Speed Weight C.G. Altitude Servo Torques 
Climb Vy Worst Case Rear Low ~Iaximum Permissible 
Cruise Level flight Worst Case Rear Low Maximum 
Permissible 
Maneuvering Level flight Worst Case Rear Low ~!aximum 
Permissible 
Descent AP V Worst Case Rear Low Maximum mo Permissible 
Climb Vy Worst Case Rear M1.d-Range ~Iaximum Permissible 
Cruise Level flight Worst Case Rear Mid-Range Maximum 
Permissible 
~Ianeuvering Level flight Worst Case Rear Mid-Range ~!aximum 
Permissible 
Descent AP Vrno Worst Case Rear Mid-Range Maximum Permissible 
Climb V Worst Case Rear High Maximum y Permissible 
Cruise Level flight Worst Case Rear High ~!aximum Permissible 
Maneuvering Level flight Worst Case Rear High ~Iaximum Permissible 
Descent AP V Worst Case Rear High ~Iaximum mo Permissible 
Approach 1.3 Vso Worst Case Rear Low Maximum Permissible 
Repeat all of the above for single engine operation. 
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Table 5-5. System Comments 
Positive 
'W Insert/Map Edit/LAT DIR to 
Map Review 
Morse Code Check 
Weight and Balance 
Moving Map Helps Orientation 
Warnings 
Negative 
Manual Paging on the Checklist 
Checklists not Programmable by Pilot 
Active Checklist Item not Emphasized 
Clutter on EHSI 
No Altitude Preselect on EHSI 
Mixed 
Compass Tape Vs Card or Arc 
Table 5-6. Hardware Comments 
Positive 
Sunlight Readability of CRT 
Keypad Layout 
Negative 
Keypad too Stiff/No Tactile Feel 
Manual Dimming on CRT 
No Voice Warnings 
Raster Scan Looks Ragged 
Pushbuttons Should be Guarded 
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SECTION 6. 
CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS 
The DAAS system design has been completed and flight tested. 
Simulator evaluations have been performed. The PAAS configura-
tion has been defined and analyzed on the basis of cost, reliabil-
ity, maintainability, and modularity. The following conclusions 
and recommendations are based on the experience associated with 
this effort to date. 
• Functional Configuration - DAAS provides expanded functional 
capability with respect to currently available avionics and 
has the potential to significantly improve single pilot IFR 
safety and efficiency. The DAAS architecture provides the 
framework for additional expansion without the requirement 
for added displays. This is accomplished by using the shared 
data base, displays and bus. The distributed a'rchi tecture 
of the system provides for functional independence. This 
minimizes the number of needed interfaces between functions 
and thereby reduces data input and subsequent pilot training. 
• Function Set - The DAAS function set is comprehensive and. 
suitable for demonstration. Operational simplification and 
functional additions have been suggested that may be appro-
priate for an operational system. 
• Cost - The DAAS concept is cost effective, and has cost ad-
vantages with respect to conventional avionics as the number 
of integrated functions increase. 
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~ Reliability - The DAAS system architecture reduces computer 
system failure rate to a negligible portion of the total 
system failure rate. Sensor and servo failure rates dominate. 
Low cost sensor and servo redundancy should be pursued with 
a goal of 10,000 hours in-flight MTBF for autopilot and basic 
navigation functions to provide extremely reliable pilot re-
lief to facilitate effective flight management. The PAAS 
configuration promises much higher functional reliability. 
~ Maintainability - DAAS offers improvements in avionics main-
tainability through improved reliability, automatic fault 
detection and isolation, and on-aircraft trouble shooting 
without special test equipment. 
• Modularity - DAAS is functionally modular, with general pur-
pose controls and displays, and hardware and software build-
ing blocks to provide varying levels of capability. Expan-
sion of capability has minimum impact on the existing aircraft 
control panel and existing avionics. 
Following is an expansion of these conclusions and recommendations. 
6~~ FUNCTIONAL CAPABILITY 
The DAAS system provides comprehensive facilities for flight 
management. Concensus of evaluations is that DAAS provides im-
proved functional capabilities with respect to current avionics, 
and has the potential to significantly improve single pilot IFR 
efficiency and safety~ Checklists, weight and balance, and per-
formance functions are convenient to use, and they support good 
pilot practices. The moving map display, IDCC data readout, and 
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comprehensive warning system inform the pilot of flight status. 
The autopilot, which couples to the NAV system, provides the 
necessary relief that allows the pilot to monitor and effectively 
manage his flight. 
The DAAS moving map display is well received and considered a 
major aid in flight management. However, the.following enhance-
ments have been suggested: 
• Terminal area display could be expanded to include stored 
approach plate details. Automated terminal area flight 
management including coupled NAV and autothrottle functions 
should be considered. 
• It would be desirable to accurately display the runway during 
landing approach. This could, perhaps, be feasible if 1) a 
strapdown AHRS with short term INS capability were a part of 
DAAS, or 2) MLS were included, or 3) GPS were included, or 
4) ILS/DME navigation mode were included. 
• A color map display would be useful to facilitate increased 
display information content. 
• Expansion of DABS to aid in congested terminal area communi-
cations would be desirable. 
• Incorporation of an EADI into DAAS would be an appropriate 
follow-on effort to further develop the concept. 
The DAAS function set is considered representative and adequate 
for demonstration purposes. There are areas where changes might 
be considered for an operational system. 
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6.2 COST 
DAAS includes significantly more functional capability at a cost 
competitive with conventional avionics, as illustrated in section 
3.3. The DAAS cost advantage will become more decisive as more 
functions are incorporated. For example, DAAS could be expanded 
to integrate: 
G Weather radar 
G Air data computer 
• Autothrottle 
• Automatic storage of airport facility data 
• AHRS 
• Radar altimeter 
• Other functions 
Therefore, with each function added total system cost per func-
tion would come down since packaging power supplies, and controls 
and displays are shared in DAAS and need not be duplicated for 
separate functions. 
Consequently, the DAAS concept of integrated avionics is cost 
effective. 
6.3 RELIABILITY, SAFETY 
The PAAS system reliability, including sensors, instruments, 
computers, and servos is estimated to be 137 hours MTBF. This 
system reliability is expected to improve as integrated circuit 
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technology advances, and electromechanical devices are replaced 
by solid state devices. 
The existing DAAS NAVjAutopilot function reliability is es~imated 
to be 9260 hours mean flight time between loss of function. 
The DAAS architecture, using advanced electronics, has produced 
a very reliable computer system. Consequently, DAAS reliability 
was affected mainly by sensor and servo failure rates; e.g., 
system sensors and servos contribute 96 percent of the autopilot 
failure rate. Since the autopilot and NAV functions are essen-
tial to effective flight management, it is recommended that low 
cost redundant sensor and servo configurations be pursued, with 
a goal of 10,000 hour NAVjautopilot flight MTBF. The DAAS 
architecture can cost effectively provide such reliability. 
The failure mode effects analysis of 86 DAAS elements concludes 
that, with recommended modifications implemented, DAAS failures 
are tolerable and safe. The DAAS safety pilot's contribution to 
flight safety is also acknowledged, especially in take-off and 
landing situations. 
System safety can be improved using the DAAS concept. Providing 
accessable and easy to use weight/balance and performance calcula-
tions and checklists will -increase. The frequency of use. Compre-
hensive warning and built-in-test functions will detect conditions 
that are currently not testable. Increased functional capability 
will reduce pilot work load. 
6.4 MAINTAINABILITY 
DAAS concept offers improved maintainability through: 
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~ Improvements in hardware reliability 
• Built-in test for automatic fault detection, localization 
• Capability for on-aircraft trouble shooting without special 
test equipment. 
6.5 MODULARITY 
The DAAS system is functionally modular. It is composed of hard-
ware and software building blocks that can be configured to pro-
vide varying levels of functional capability and cost. Expansion 
of capability will have minimum impact on the existing DAAS air-
craft control panel and avionics. 
The DAAS system can be adapted to interface with devices from a 
variety of manufacturers. For example, hardware and software 
modules could be developed to allow use of different NAV receivers, 
even if the NAV receivers were not equipped for remote tuning. 
Manual tuning would be required in this version of DAAS, on com-
mand from the IDCC. The system can also accept input signals 
from sensors supplied by a variety of manufacturers. The variety 
of subsystems with which a production version of DAAS would be 
compatible would be determined in a marketing study. 
DABS integration into DAAS late in the DAAS development program 
demonstrates basic modularity. Incorporation of DABS required: 
~ Installing a DABS transponder and control panel in the air-
craft, and interfacing it to the DAAS computer unit. 
~ Adding a DABS processor module, and two DABS interface elec-
tronics modules to the DAAS computer. 
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~ Adding three DABS pages to the IDee. 
• Adding a DABS "Message Pending" light to the panel. 
The DAAS processor module is appropriate for DABS computations. 
DAAS keyboard and IDee page formats are appropriate for DABS. 
DABS readily fit into the DAAS framework, thereby demonstrating 
that DAAS is a highly modular system. 
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GLOSSARY 
ADI - altitude direction indicator 
AHRS - Altitude Heading Reference System 
ALT - altitude, altitude hold 
APPR - Approach 
ARM - arm 
ATC - Air Traffic Control (National) 
BIT - built-in test 
CC - central computer 
CCU - central computer unit 
COM - communication 
COMM - communication message 
CPU - central processor unit 
DAAS - Demonstration Advanced Avionics System 
DABS - Discrete Address Beacon System 
D~m - distance measuring equipment 
EEPROM - Electrically Eraseable PROM 
EHSI - electronic horizontal situation indicator 
ELM - extended length message 
EPROM - electrically alterable PROM 
ETA - estimated time of arrival 
FAR federal aviation regulation 
FDI - flight director indicator 
GMT - Greenwich mean time 
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GLOSSARY 
GS - glides lope 
HDG - heading 
lAS indicated air speed 
IDee - integrated data control center 
IFR instrument flight regulations 
LOe localizer 
MDA - minimum descent altitude 
MLS - microwave landing system 
NAV - navigation 
NAVAID - navigational aid 
PAAS Projected Advanced Avionics System 
PROM - programmable read-only memory 
RAM - random access memory 
RAU - radio adapter unit 
RMI - radio magnetic indicator 
ROM - read-only memory 
RPM - revolutions per minute 
SEL - select 
SM - standard message 
UV - ultra-violet 
UV-EPROM - ultra-violet eraseable PROM 
VFR - visual flight regulations 
VHF - very high frequency 
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GLOSSARY 
VNAV - vertical navigation 
VOR - VHF omnidirectional (omni) range 
VOR/LOC - VOR localizer 
VOR/LOC/GS - VOR localizer glides lope 
VSI - vertical speed indicator 
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DAAS FAILURE MODES AND EFFECTS ANALYSIS 
143 
I-l 
~ 
~ 
FAlLu~l 
!lO. 
2 
U,IAS LLlIlEIiT 
[ncooln9 Altl-
O:lI!ter 
Co-Pilot 
~r 
fAlLURl AfFlCTtD IJAAS fMLlJRE 
/la. fAlLURL RATl*lJb lLLHE/lTS lffLCTS Of fAILURE WAIIII. HC. CATlGallY CI.H·ili.T~ 
-571 fault ZOIl Altimeter Erroneous Vhua 1 Output Yes, POiler J Uurlng JFk-"IIIJillul'~. 
wltllin the 
Altlm. 
Conclusion: 
fault 
In the 
Althoe ter 
Indicator Servo loop 
DabS Tr.nspon<l. Erroneous Uutput Lrror Ched J 
KT76A " AmIJ~r 1I91.t 
All' CPU Erroneous J 
"G. Proxlnll ty lIan •• • 
All' .. I~CC Cpll Erroneous "Alt. Advhory" 
light Info. (Alt. Alllrt, 
I-WA & 011. r . l 
All' 10 flAV CPU Lrroneous ParaJOleter 
1.0. & !lav. Calculation J 
Far 91 do not require redundant althoeters for cu. 1 IfK, only for CAt 11. 
The Probabllt ty for i fa nure Is - 10-3 during 4 hours f1 t. s Ignl flcalltl 
The co-pilot Instrulloentation requlreo In OMS. OK. 
200 Al tlmeter 
Indicator 
Erroneous Visual Output I/o 2 
Proxl",lty I.Grn. 1.10 lIut 
uetect. Varltcal Ou~lacl~~ 
Hhl~aJs Traffic ~u"lrol. 
Wrong Warn. T"r..s"ol~ 
·~lIcuncl.ry Effect" 
~rol"J fuel or T.U.-
Utsunce Calculation. 
11111 cause Sl\l,1I! Inconv.n-
lence until dec I~~J wllicn 
altllll. failed. 
Conclusion: Loss of the co-pilot altitude Info 15 i IIllnor problelll to the IJAAS pilot. Tile probability of loss of -' ~ 
botn oI>aro-altlwers during 4 fit. IIrs. 15: A- (Apltot t A altllll)ptlot. (A pltot t l iltllll)co-jll1ot - (4.250.10 ) 
- 10- . A catastrophe will occur If the Ale collides with an object not detected ~r tile I'roxhllty 
warning syste'". The probabll Ity for this to happen Is considerably less lhan 10· • 
]. ], 
j lj 
I-'-
If:l. 
Ul 
" 
t"IL",(L 
,f"'. 1J/Vi~ &..LLIIL"T uv. 
1 
fi,ILLriL 
FAIL~f{L .(i.TL * iI)b 
j,fhCT..l> uM~ 
LlHilliTS i.ffLCT:i vi' FAILlJ;;L wI<Ri •• LTC. 
fIllL~KL 
LnTll'ullY 
! 
LlJ.'i.L .. l!> 
Kdllar .. I tl""'t~r KTUI fdult ill 11/1' CI't ... luCC Lrrall~ous .... Praxlnl tJ 
iliar/! •• 
R.J. Alt. 
VJllJ. 
T,.e ~rot,d"il1LJ «,0-1. 
---------
5 
b 
True Air 
S~eed Sensar 
IA~ Instru-
lIIent 
CO-Pilot 
IllS Instru-
~lent 
Air Uata 
Ca,,!,u ter 
Hau. t.lt. 
Incl. ,.lIt. 
Canc~: 
au,", fur Ililro.-allj , 
iIIl' CPu ~ LII~J Lrran~ulls: l:aJ. ,\It. Ilifa. (iII:",,,r Lt~,1t) " , ~ilJar-;'1 tl.". fdil.rO!s 
I.a far ~l r"~ulr~n)l;lIt all Kad. Alt. If Instal\~J, fa\J. Ilarn. re~lIlred. Valluitj sl~nal (j~. 
A critical situatiall (4) accur if t.uth tne .loIra. Alt. and kaJ. Alt. falls. 
""9IiUlbl~ I'ra['ablJ Ity. OK. 
VAllO fault in luO 
Tas OR 
NP & ,lav. CPU 
LilSI 
lrroneous Il1l'uts to lIav. 
& Fue I consun •• 
calculations 
.10 2 Pllut coufus"J. "II~,'t 
crede d ~ro" I ".. if lIu 
rilJlo .lav. aVd\JolLoI". 
Panel 
WC-
lOO 
Sign. Cand. 
Conclusion: TAS not required by far 91. 
It Is very unlikely «Iil-') t.,at a TAS failure will cause a critical situation in lJM:. 
due to redundant lAS and VOR/UI~E Infonllatlon. 
Instru-
lIIent 
Fa lIure 
Conclusion: 
Instru-
ment 
failure 
Concl US I!!!!,: 
Instru-
'lent 
Failure 
Conclusion: 
ldO lAS 
Indicator 
Lrroneous visual outr-ut Uo l. 
Single lAS instrUl,lCnt OK for Cat 1 IfK, far ~l. Z required Cat. II conditions. 
Loss of lAS Instrulllent not critical In OM!;. Redundant visual speed Info. available. 
2UU lAS 
Indicator 
lrroneous visual output 
Loss uf Co-Pilot iA!> Info. no problelll to the II110t. 
lio U"ylectable to I'llot. 
KedunJdnt Info. available 
(lAS + KPH) 
The probalJlllty of loss of botil lAS Indicators are (wltn reference to fault 'w. 2): 
(4·JJ ... ·lu-')2 -l·IO-'. Tne risk for a catastropne Is significantly lower in tile uMS 
systems slnc~ redundant Info. such as VOR/IJH£ and angle of attack are available. 01(. 
2\J(J AlP CPU lrroneous A-II SI9nai 
Far jlirt n do Ilot require a JrJ lAS/ALT. Sensor. 
Yes 
AI t. Va 1101 
(Antler L Ig'lt) 
The AIt./IAS valid anJ available redundant Info. will winllllize risks. 
l AdJltlonal Alt. 6 V!> 
Info. ava iJabl~. Tne 
... lIot lIIonitors Alt. 1101 ... 
FA I LlJIll 
,iO. llAA!> UlHL,II jill. 
II Pitol syst,,"' left 
9 Co-pllot 
pltot system right 
~ 
~ 10 Outside air (j) temp. 
fAILLIl~ Aff~CTlIl 11M!> fAILUkl 
fAILUlll KJITL *lUb LLUIUH:. LfflCT:. Of fhlLURL IJARI4.LTC. LATLGUIIY CliNHtlih 
faulty 50 
PTOT or 
PSIAI 
faulty 50 
PTOT or 
PSIAT 
Conclusion: 
sensor or 5 
slgll. condo 
filllure 
Conclusloll: 
Althleler 
VSI-Indicator 
lAS-Indicator 
AOC IWC-33i1 
Altlllleter 
VSI-Indlcalor 
lAS-I nd I ca tor 
Erroneous: 
All & 4-11 Info. 
lAS & VSI 
flight wdrnlllg 
proxl"ity- • 
transponder response 
Erroneous visual Info. to 
co-pllot 
110 1 
UO 
Dual PITOT systePls required by fAR 91 only for CAT. II operations. for OMS. 
PITOT system provide adequate redundancy. 
The probability of failures In both left and right PITOT systems 
Very lOll risk ~ 
nAY-CPU Erroneous Input to T.O .. 
cruise. and fuel/distance 
calculat. 
uo 2 
Confusing Info. 
Rhk for wron9 
action In Inl 
condo Pilot or 
ground control. 
Co-pilot lIot In toe 
control loop. 
the. co-pilot and the right 
_,. -7 
Is - (4· 50· hI ) <10 • 
fuel qty. cnec~s 
will alarm ~llot In 
t I .. e for refue II"'J. 
Probability of f.lliure 
low 
lio OAT re4ulred by fAil. 
liAl failure Is not assuilled to cause sevo:!re pnot problems. It Is sU9gesteu. however. 
that Iliputs to calculations such as OAT ALl etc. are dlsplaied to the pilot wilen useu. 
fAILUI{L fA I LlJl(L AffltTEil OMS FAILURI:. 
.,U. UAA~ LlLllt.llT 11I.l. FAILURl MTt. *IUIi lLlMlllTS lfHCTS OF fAllUk~ WARIl. LTC. tAT[GUilY ClJIoli'ltlll:. 
11 1'l4gll~tic flux oJU faulty 2U ka~lo Mignetlc Erroneous Vhu,l IlIItput. iio l The "Hut .. hi..! "t' .;-; 
uetec tor 11~ Mig. lIorth IndlcHor (Ulr. GYRO s I.ved to Indlcitors giving cou~h(~llt 
ref. signal and lltSI .'.g. fx. lIet.) faulty Inforillil ti on. 
All' - CPU faulty 1Id9. Lrror l "'Hill essential uui tl 
In iId!l-hOld IIOde 
IIAV - CPU faulty 'IAvlg,tlon l !:abl.n filter will uut_"t 
IDCC-CPU .nd fuel/dlst.nce exc~sslvl;l ,oinJ, svollin~ 
ulculitlons calculations. 
Conclusion: Far ~l requires mag. dlr. Indicator and dlr. GYRO for IFII. 
---- Co-pilot dlr. GYIIO and Mag. compass IIlikes OMS okl 
l dlr. IIYROS req. for Cat II coroJ. 
12 Slave Acces- KA Oead or 10 The Indicator Faulty visual outjlUt 110 !!In an~ .... y. Co.l"as5 Info 
51A wrong avalla~le to "Hut, 0:1 1,,11-
out~ut nates confusion. 
Conc1~s Ion: Far ~l do not ex~lIcltly ~tate the need of a slave accessory. 
~ Ll ulr.ctlollal t.Yl{ll faultJ JUO RdJlo magnetic lrroneous visual outf'ut Yes 3 ill r. liYI(O essent 141. ~el;l jj:;. 
'1 illcl~Jln~ KSG Iidy. Out- InJlc.tor and Ildg. va 11<.1 ~~ 110. 11 Clll. •• lt:llh. 
:'cott T/Ul1;\ 1..15 I'ut lIISI (AIlI~r Llgnt) 
h/~ - CPu Faulty H<Jg. t.rror In 
lidg •• 10<.18 
IlAV - CPU Faulty navigation 
and fuei/dlst.ncil 
IOCC-CPu ca I cu la tI ons 
Conc1us Ion: See fault 110. 11 conments. 
The Ulr. GYkO validity-test cover.ge - 7U:O. Probability for un<.lelected failure (u.J·4 • JuO'lO-b) 
- 4 'lu-~ during a 4 hours f\ Ight. Stili slgniflc.ntl 
14 Radio magnetic KZ Fault In llJ RJoIi Indicator Erroneous v Isua I ou tpu I 110 
" 
I-Iag. CUIIljlass, 1'111 anJ tri~1 
Indicator 226 the RIll I'royl<.les r~~unJant Info to 
GYRO or VOR mode ~jlot. 
Conclusion: Far requirement see 110. 11. Oil. 
fAILURl fAILURE AfFECTED UAAS fAILIII<~ 
liU. OMS ELHIEUT ''0. FAILURE RAIL· 10· ElEIlEliTS EffECTS Uf fAILURE WAIIII. ETC. CATlGORY CIl1HlNTS 
Co-Pilot {OO faulty 20 PIli Erroneous Vlsu41 Output ilo 15 Mig. flux 112 Hag. North (Slive Ace.) 
Iletector Ref. Signal 
16 Slave Aceessory j(A Ilead or 
51A Wrong 
10 Slive Ace. Erroneous VisuAl Output 110 ~ I to ti18 pilot 
Output 
17 Dlrectlonill KG fAulty JUO PI/I lrroneous Visual Output 110 (2 to co-~l1ot) 
GYRU lOlA IIdg. (Slilve Acc.) 
Output 
1<1 Pic tura 1 llov. /(1 Hag. Card J3U Pili Erroneous VisuAl Output No 
Indica tor ti25A Error (P.il.l. ) 
Conclusion: Loss of cO-~llot slaved directional GYRU Info. Is a minor problem to the OMS "lIot. 
The probabl Ity of one failure In tile pilot sllVed directionAl GYRO system and one 
fanure In tile co-pilot system h (4."60.1U-i)2 <IU. -~ Tne ~robAblllty Is relllOte and tne 
~ mag. Ciliupass and VOR Info. Avalhble makes the risk very low. 
~ 19 Turn ilnd Slip "RC faulty I~U Turn Rilte Erroneous Visual Output 110 Turn rate deterwlnea frOlJl 00 Instrument Allen" Turn Rate IndicAtor roll Angle as re~lace~cent 
Instrument 
Faulty 10 Slip 110 Side acceleration sensla liy 
Slip Indicator pilot acceptable re~lace"lent. 
InstrUIIllnt 
Conclusion: Single slip-skid IlkIlcator required for Cat. I and 11 IFR, By fir ~I. 
loss of this Instrlluent minor problem. 
lO Co-Pilot filulty 150 Turn Rate Erroneous Visual Output No 
1'Uriiaiid 5 II p Turn I<ate Indicator 
Ins truullnt Instrument 
faulty IU Slip Indlciltor Lrroneous Visuill O~tput No 
Slip 
Instrument 
Conclusion: Ilegllglble to the pilot and co-pilot. 
fAILURl 
110. DAA~ lLll1~IH 110. fAILURE 
21 Yaw Ra te GYRO GG faul ty 
l4U GYRO 
~usion: 
l. IloyJe of MUck Typ .. Faulty 
~ .. usur anJ LC ()ut~ut 
111111< ... tur 
fonclusion: 
1-1 ~j ~"rtic.l LYI:U VG Fault; 
IP- 2,jJ Pitcu 
.. uJ/or to Roll 
Si~ual 
Concluli Ion: 
fAILURE AfflCTLU 
AATE*106 ELlH£IITS 
~O AlP - CPU 
EfFECTS Of fAILURE 
Worst Case: !!udder trans-
ient and convergent Vaw 
oscillations. 
OMS 
WARU. lTC. 
110 
fAILUKE 
CATEGORY 
l 
Cut-I1LUT~ 
Ilicullv"nieot bi:fure Y/" 
and AlP dlsenga~ed. 
It is assUliled that Ule rudder servo slip clutch protects against dallyerous 5111"- alld 
anyular-"ccl~ratiolls ami thot til" AlP dump switch is an ade4uate me .. n to dtsengaye tile 
Y/ll. 
1I.n.l AII' - CPU ~u 11 warning given it 
non.1ol1 01.. ur 110 t 9 ivell 
IIIlell n;eJ"J. 
i;o 
110 Far r"ljuireUient on an~le of aUdck illJicutor or stall warnlo',j. 
JJ,j AttituJ~ Uir .. ct. Lrrolleuus "flrtlficlal 
IlIdlcatur lIurhon" 
AlP - CPu 
~ervos 
Lil~1 - CPU 
Errors in control la"s. 
lrror in predicted 
TrenJlines 
y .. s 
"V~rt. i.YkO 
Valid" 
(Alilber Li!jilt) 
~ 
2 
far ~I reljuirt!s 1 "Artlfical ilorizon" fur Cat. I cOlwltlons and 2 for Cat. 11. 
Tile coverage of til" validity test Is - (U.3·4·]3u·1I)-6) - 4-lU-' slglltficdhtl 
Foir ~3.132!1 e) 4 lIardover failure in tile vertical GYRO roll output propayes via 
V i;ua 1 CIIed of L"e 
InJic .. Lur allJ ,ry.S':,lcCh ~t 
s~""J, vert. S~eeu "IIJ 
attitude will rt:vea 1 a 
fault. 
uifficult Failure tu ".tect, 
eSpecially for z .. ro uutput, 
5111ce iwl, iI/~ d"J L,"~J all 
agree. Clus .. O"SerVd"C" uf 
otller ~L-llistrul"ellts 
assullIt:U. 
tile AlP cont. laws to roll. yaw alld pitch axis. lhis h not acc"ptal.ole to Far ~r wordiuy. 
A LKldlflcation to t!llHllliate Ule far-conflict is recollinellded. 
fIlILLJKi: fAILUKl AffECTEU OM:. fAILUHt 
hU. UIvI) lL~NljjT .10. fAILUKl AATl*luli UEMliiTS lfflCT:' uF fAILURE WAKN. nco CATlliUilY CUI'hlllT!) 
~4 Attitude Ulr. KCI faul ty 340 "Artlfl. Horlz.· faulty Visual Output No l AlP DIOdes anu rtlUUllddnt Illto 
Indicator 310 "Artlf. Indicator avallible. 
"Artlf!. 1I0r\'· lIorizon" 
Conclus Ion: far requlre&rents. see hult 110. ll. 
The Ll\AS Is OK In this respect. 
<5 Co-Pilot KG faul t In 670 ·Artlfl. lIoriz.· faul ty Visual Output 110 Thll UMS ~l1ot can edS ill 
"1Ir1TfT." 251l "Artlfl. Indicator determine tllat the ~u~od is 
ilorizon!! 1I0rlzon" faulty. Several r"",,,,,,(lallt 
Unit Indicators avalla~l" to 111.11. 
Conclusion: Loss of the co-pilot Artificial "orl~on Is iI minor problem. Tile suction 
Indicator snows If "power" Is i1vallable anll provides valuable Info to 
the pilot. 
The prOba~illty l of failures ~ both vertlca4GYkllS and ·Artlflclal IIorlzons" durlnu a 4 hr. 
flight Is • 4 • (330 i' 340) • 10 JI 4 .670· 10 or 7 ·10 ..... The risk for Ion 
of otll "Artificial Iiorlzons· Is not negligible and OliY briny tile "l1ot III Il 
deillanding situation. 
I-' 
01 ~u Manifold Panel Instrunent 1.1 Hap Indlclllor hulty Visulli uutput 110 
: ~ In casol of an InstrUl.",nt 0 Prolssure fa II urll failure tnese lustrulI",nts InstrulieRt and audiovisual feed backs jlrovlde enough Infu. tCl 27 lnglnes KPH Panel Instrument 10 KI'II Indicator faulty Visual Output 110 the pilot to alluw corrtlct InstruDent failure failure localization. 
III Lxh. lias. Panel Instrument III lGT Indicator hulty Visual Out"ut 110 2 
Tellljl. Instr. failure 
19 Engine Status Panel Low 011 10 lnS' Status fau Ity V Isua I Ou t~u t 110 3 
r 
faulty Indication of low 
Instrument 2 Pressure In Icator 1 011 pressure ~ .. y JurillY 
or IIlgh SOllie conditions force 
Temp. the pilot to shut off the 
enylne and land A.S.A.P. 
31l lWJlne Status Panel Low 011 10 lnglne Status faulty Visual Output rio 3 
Instrument 2 Pressure Indicator 2 
or IIlgh 
Temp. 
Conclusion: far ~I requires with exce"tion of the EGT. tile engine InstrUillentatlon. Listed above. (VfK condttiuns). 
OMS Independent of these Instruments. 
j i j, ) . 
\ 
/ 
FAILURl FAILURE AFFECTED OMS FAILURl 
110. IJMS ELHlEilT 140. FAILURE RATE*IO' ELlIIEIiTS LFFECTS OF FAILURE WARll. LTC. CATEGORY ClJ/·k1lUT:. 
31 Fuel flow hulty 5 Fuel Flow Faulty Visual Output 110 2 fu~l Ilty. Info. aVillla~le 
Sensor 1 Sensor Indicator 
IDCC faulty IDce Info: No 2 "Estllll. fuel Relllalnlny" 
"fuel Rea.alnlng TIme" lOay Indicate too IlIUch 
"lstha. Fuel Remaining" left. which will IIIlslead 
the pl1ot. 
Conc Ius Ion: Far 91 do not require a fuel flow sensor. 
A faulty sensor might result in a pilot decision to continue a flight without sufficient fuel. 
..... 
Fuel qty. cross checks may not reveal thl! situation. It is a low ~ro(,abl1lty «10-') that tne 
(J1 pilot Blight end up In a flight safety critical situation (4). 
..... 32 Fuel flow faulty !i 
Sensur 2 Sensor IiJllITlCAL TO fAULT 110. 31. 
3J Fuel Ilty. Panel hul ti ltiO 
Sensor 
fuel ljty. 
Indica tor 
faulty Visual Output 110 2 UMS provides Independent 
and redundant Info. re-
L or R gardlny rCAlilllln~ fuel. 
tonclus 1011: Far ~1 requires fuel qty. InstrUl>-.nt for VFR conditions. IJMS supports tne pilot In his 
fuel/dhtance/tlale calculations. which bljJroves the probability of detecting fuel qty. 
InstrUl/lelit failures. 
34 .ic1nlfold Cele- Faulty 5 AlP - CPU Warning + No Hap hult Ilo Redundant engine InSlru-
Pressure sco Sensor AlBber LIght men ts prov Ides ade'lua te 
Sensors 110 Warn. + Hall Faul t Info. 
35 [nglne KPH IIASA faulty III AlP - CPt. Warning + 110 RPH fault 110 Redundant engine Instru-
Sensors and Sensor IDCC AI/Iller Light Dlen ts prov Ides ade'lua te 
F IV Converter Light 110 Warning + RPll Fault Info. 
Conclusl.!!!!: OK. 
fAILUHE fAILlJRE AfHCTEO IlM!. fAILUllt 
NO. OMS ELUlWT 110. fAILURE RATE*IU6 EWIlUTS EffECTS Of fAILURE ilAllll. LTC. CATlGORY COI·V·lblT:' 
36 Wing fldP P05. faulty 20 AlP. CPU Warning + OK fl.p 1'05. 110 Kegular In51'"ct101l -Sensors ~otentlo· IIJCC killer LI~ht routines will still L" 
meter 110 Warning + 01: flaps followell lIy tile "Ilut. 
37 Elevator Trim faulty 2Ll AlP· CPU Warning + 01: flap "os. 110 Reglll4r InSpect 1011 -
Pos. Sen5ur Potentlo- luCC AluLer L1gilt routines will still ... " 
meter 110 Warning + UK fI.p pos. fOllowed ill t'llI I'II ... t. 
3U Cowl flaps hulty 4 AlP· CPU Warliing t UK flap pos. 110 H"~lIlar Ins~ectloll • 
Pos. Sensors Switch lIlee Alllber Light routines will stili "" 
110 I/.rnlng + Ill: fl.p I'os. followeJ lIy t,le i'llut. 
I-' 3~ Lanlliny liear faulty 4 AlP· CPU W<lrnl'IZ t UI: 1'051tloo 110 I\eyulu In51'ectlon • 01 Pos. S"nsors Swltcil lIJec AlaLer Ight routlneii will stili lie tv 110 Warning + OK pOSition followed by tile I'Il ... t. 
4U Callin Lloorii hulty 4 A/f • CPU WarIJlng t 0": "oshloIJ ilu keyul.r lns"ectloll • 
Pas. Sensors Switch loeC AlillI"r Light routines .. Ill stili be 
110 Warning t UK position followed by tne "lIot. 
41 ilUX. ~u,,1 I'w . ..,s faulty 4 AlP· Cl'lI llirnlng t 0'; "OSition 110 Keyular Ins.,ectlull • 
!>WItCIl vosltlon Switch lUCe Am .. er Light routines will stili .. " 
Iro "arliing + OK I'osltlon followeJ LI tile ~lJot. 
Conelus Ion: far l3 requires "hcn trl'D Indicator. (lncluJed In !.aslc InstrUDl~lItatlo,,) IJAAS 
"rovIJ .. s additional Info. to alert the "lIot If the AIC st4tu~ Is iii. It is 
assumed that trle to<lay ustlll lire fllgllt clleck routines will be falloweJ. (If lIat, 
the UAA5 Illay Introduced new failure /IIodes.) 
J L. 1 __ .' 
FAllUHl FA1LlJll~ AFflCTlO OMS fA 1 LUIlf. 
1m. DAAS lLlIIlIIT NO. FA1LlJRl RATE*IO' lLUlElHS lFfECTS Of f AllUIlE WAR.I.UC. CATlGORY CU:INI.IITS 
4~ ~ .. ~ - ~wttCII ~ontrol failed :. NP - CPU ClIS-Mode lngaged lio j AlP and noht tilOJes ..115-
0"..1 relot.J IIheel ~wltcn Clutcnes accidently. engaged without I'llot 
loytc awareness. NIl Info. 
Conclusion: tu ~l r':'1uests adeljuate Gleans to dlsenyage tne AlP. 01(. It Is asSUP\ed that the 
I'llot by ~l(>nltOrlhg the Instrlll1l!nts will detect. not destred CWS-mode engagetilent and 
that ne will hold the cont. whe .. 1 steady when releasing the AlP. 
43 lIO-Aroun~ Control failed 4 AlP - CPlJ Go-around modI! engaged uo l Infonloattoll ~lven Oh tile 
Switch IIheel Switch 'acctden t Iy. allnullctator panel. 
Go-around mode not l lJemandtllY ~lOtIIIllitS to tile 
engaged when wan ted. pilot, eSl'ecta Iy If In till: 
A/P-Ap~r/r.~ ~IOJ~. 
Conclusion: If tile go-around l,lOde lIot Is aulla~le when needed" less experienced pilot may 
even create a critical situation. (4.4·10-· x ?,Iow probability however!) 
...... 44 ln9·/I.Ilsen- ~ontrol fall .. d 4 AlP - CPU Illsengage of AlP-modes /10 2 Anllullcedl tn 9a~e-~wltcn Wile., I S .. ltch Trl •• Hotor accidently. W Pitch Tril" Only Aut. Trill' available l Use Auto.-Trlw 
4S ue,,~-Tri" COlltrol hllo<l 4 AlP - CPU 110 llanua I Tria. l "se Autu. - Tr"" 
PI tCll Iliho .. 1 ~wltcn Trl~. ~Iotor Run-away lrlw l use Autu.-Trlill 
(.audusj"n: Tile Autu.-ldll' function re~laces ~nuill Trlol III hiP LweS. 
~u I\~t"pil"t Coutrol fa Il~<l 4"" All' - CPu UI sl!ngage of AII' .10 Z Anllunc.:JI 
!lUlU!, SwttclI ;JI.c~1 ~witCll Clutches IIIOdes accldentl,. 
Qllu 1\~la,,' 
ilot poss 1~le to Jisengaye J LleJliallJIII~ III all AlP fdll .. r~ 
AlP. s ituu lUll OVdr ... 'mer 
~ossi~I". 
Cuncluslo!!,: Tile ~robabl1tt, for this situation Involves Loth a sl~lt'h falJure anJ failure III ~noth"r f11~ht safety crltkal ellOlllent. lstllllated pro~4blllty • - (4·d'1O-· x 4·}Uu ... ·lu-'1-1·hr1 • u,;. 
~ 
UI 
~ 
TA~Ll 2 
FAlLURl 
NO. 
47 
43 
4~ 
tiU 
HIEA 
UMS ELEMl:.11T 
(;OIlIilUIl I ~a t I 011 
Trallsc~lv(:rs 
Ant~llnas 
Navigation 
Receivers 
Antennas 
UMI:. rece I ver 
antenna 
Transl'onder 
Antenna 
NO. 
t;y-
1:11i 
KlI-
53 
1:11-
62A 
KT-
7GA 
FAILUR" AFFECTED 
FAILUllt RATl*10' EUHENTS 
Faulty JJU COIII.lUn I ca t I on 
IIG ... lo Aids 
OMS 
EFFECTS OF fAILURl WARtl. ETC. 
Uu cOI."lUnicdtlon 100 
FAILUIlE 
CATlGORY W1HltlTS 
Assuiliold Fclr ~1 rules 
fo11owe.!. 
Con~luslon: Far !II re'luires I two-~Iay radio conlllunl~ations systel,l, Cat I ilnd II. 
Faulty 
VOR 
Conclusion: 
Faulty 
Receiver 
Concl us I on: 
Faulty 
Transpond~ 
Conclus Ion: 
UMS hds J systems, Including alltennas. Tile .,ro\Jablllty o>f loss of 
~or.lllunication due to faulty transceivers Is for UMS (4·JJU·1O-6j2 x 4·661l'ILI-6.-!j·lu-u 
(Co-pilot transceiver 660.10-6 hult/FLT Ilour). 0":. 
2~0 Radio Adpt. 1J0x 
NAV-CPU 
[IISI - IlHI 
Radio Adpt. Iiox 
Faulty Uavlgatlon Info. 
110 or faulty VOR/GS 
directions. 
110 2 Traffic cuntral suppurt 
rallar vectorlrl\l IH~. 11M:' 
dea.J-r~c~onln9. 
IIAV-CPU 
[USI - ADI 
Far !II requires appropriate single channel navigation equipment for Cat. I conditions 
and dual LOC/GS - receiving systems and a fe-guidance system for CCit It conditions. 
OMS provides triplex receivers and duplex-antennas, Including co-pilot back ul'. OK. 
5UU Radio Adapt. \lox faulty llavlgatlon Info. 
IIAV-CPU 
Uo 2 Fault detected. VOR 
available. 
UISI 
Far ~I requires 1lI'1E If flying at and above 24000 feet. Separate antenna. OK. 
400 Radio Adallt. bOX tlo Identification possible No 
far 91 do not require transponder. 
Traffic control takes 
proper action. 
The probability for a failure giving Information poulble to misinterpret by traffic control 
Is neglected. Sel'ilrate antenna. 
) ) 
I-' 
CJ1 
CJ1 
tAILUKl fAILUl{t AFFECTED UAAS 
IIu. UAAS ELU1t.,IT IIU. FAILUkl kATl *Iu~ ELEMENTS 
EFFECTS OF 
FAILURE WARII. lTC. 
FAILUkl 
CATlGOkY Cl»tlWTS 
51 
52 
53 
54 
55 
56 
57 
58 
Audio headset. KMA-24 Fault In 200 
receiving 
paru 
Fault In 
transmit 
part. 
Earlets, 
apeAker. 
lIicrophone. 
No audio lnfo. 
Talk, Nav. at MIl 
80 outgoing talk 
NO 
One-way conn pOlslble 
CONCLUSION I FAE 91 require. only one cOllllllUnlcation .Ylte... (Slnale failure allowed to block all audio c ..... unlcatlon!) 
OMS provide. 3 leparate .Yltema poulble to COnnect to the pllot or copllot headlet or Ip~ake .. vi_ re-
dundant switches on the audio panel. Very good redundancy. OK. 
Switch NAV 1 SEL Stuck In 4 
one pOlition 
NAV 2 SEL "4 
!HE SEL 4 
VOR SEL IIMI 4 
LOC/GS SEL ADI 4 
NAV-CPU Only one of manual or OMS 
NAVI - RECEIV control avallable. 
NAV-CPU 
NAV2-RECEIV 
NAV-CPU Only one of NAV I, 2, or 
IHE RECEIV OMS control _vallable 
NAV 1.2 RECEIV Only VOR 1 or 2 or none of 
RMI VOR 1.2 avall. on IIMI 
Radio _dpt. Only LOC/GS Info. frOlll 
box ADI NAV 1 or NAV 2 or what 
IlAAS Beleet. avail. on 
ADI 
NO 
NO 
NO 
NO 
NO 
CONCJ.USIONI These Iwitch .. do not repreoent alngle point fallur .. In critical oIngle 
channela. OK. Co-pllot backup. 
lDeC keyboard & 
touch 1'. 
Faulty In- 50 
puts to 
IDeC 
lDeC Selector Iwltchel Faulty 40 
mode .election 
IOCC, CPU 
NAV-CPU 
EHSI 
IDeC, CPU 
Erroneoul fit. plan, flight NO/YES 
atatu,. way points. map, etc. 
Wrong & not changeable "page." NO 
Aa.umed to create a 
confustng .ttuattun befor~ 
the pllot flndo out how 
• fault affectl OMS 
function, and how he has 
to let the Iwitchea for 
correct .ystem operation. 
Keyed in measages dis-
played on IDeC before 
entered. Detectable. 
Not wanted DIode ae 1-
ected & not po .. lble 
to select desired mode. 
59 lDeC CPU, refr .. h- Faulty 75 IDeC, CPU Wrong or garbeled Info. YES Pilot mlal •• lDeC AID. 
memory & computation dlaplayed, not under- BITE Pllot detects the 
60 
61 
dlaplay & pre'.n- 300 .tandable failure. 
tation 
CONCl.USIONI The probablilty of the pllot '. not detecting ''No 57 errora" by IDeC or EIISI check. la very low. Ok 
In thla respect! The BITE detect I !kout 80t_~f all comput~, fallures, loAllch reducea the probablUty 
of undetected fallurel from 75.4'10 • 3·10 to 0.2·3·10 •• 6.10- 14 hro. 
EIISI Selector switches Faulty 20 EHSI-CPU 
EllS I 
Wrong & not changeobla mod.. NO Not pOllible to select 
desired mode. 
EllS I , CPU & BIM, 
refresh'"'wellwry 
snd 
dloplay 
mode 
selection 
Faulty 75 
computation 
and 
presentation 300 
or .ealel. 
Wrong or garbled 
Info. dloplayed 
-6 -3 
YES 
BITE 
Pilot mioses EIISI Info. 
Fault detect poulble 
by pilot. 
'l"be probablUty for 10 .. of EHSI 10 "'400·4·10 • 1.6·10 per 4 flt. hro. 6 
The po.slbll1ty of reconflguratlon (DIM + CPU) reduc .. the probability to 4·32)·10-. 1.3.10-3 ... ulIllng lOOt 
BITE coverage. 
....... 
CJ1 
m 
fAILlJHL llAAS 
IIll. UAAS HLBLIIT 110. FAILURJ:: 
FAILURl 
RATl*hl' 
AFfECTED 
ELOONTS 
EFFECTS OF 
FAILURE WAR,I. HC. 
FAILUkl 
CATlloOKY COI·Mk,lb 
62 
63 
64 
1>5 
66 
61 
68 
69 
10 
CONCLUSION: Reconfiguratlon of the .. Oat reUable .l ..... nt. does not Improve the rhk oltuaUon vgry much! The co-pilot 
NAV.-!&clUtlea mak .. OMS OK. BITB reduceo undetected computer failureo to 15.10- per nt. hr. or 
60'10 per flight. 
Annunciator 
panel & drive 
circuit. 
KAP-
315 
Fault In 30 
panel or 
dl"iv. circ. 
Annunciator 
panol 
His.ed or wrong mod. atatu. 
Info. 
NO 
CONCl.USJONI FAR 23.1329 reque.t. me.na to Inform the pilot what AID -HAV • 
.. ado 10 engaged. Swltch padUano are not accepUble. OMS 
OK In thb respect. 
Hode controller KMC- Faulty trlm 60 AlP-CPU No trlm/hdg ael avail. 
and drive cir- 340 or hdg .el. various part. Trl .. /hdg ael activated 
cuttl knob of OMS accidentally. 
Faulty tog- 180 Engage not vanted mode 
gla switches Dllengage vanted mode 
Not deflnod mode (e.g. 
ATT~ALT) 
Faulty 801en- 100 A(;t;:ldental engage or disen-
old swltchea gage of Alp (Y/D) mod .. 
CONCl.IISJON; FAll 23 requirement on accealiblUty of controla .. et. OK. 
Auto pilot 
yaw clutch, aervo 
Roll Clutch, aervo 
Pitch clutch, servo 
Trim clutch, servo 
Clutchea cOllman 
logic 
Fault ln any 10 
hardware 
Faulty 
circuitry 
10 
10 
50 
Control lurface Servo not movable 
Servo run away clutch not 
locking clutch allw. 
locked 
Trim not "",veable 
Tr 1m run Iway 
Control lur- None of tha clutche. en-
face. gagea. All clutchea 
atay engaged. 
NO 
NO 
NO 
NO 
Yea 
Trim 
monitor 
NO 
2 
2 
2 
2 
3 
3 
3 
Hight temp. mislead 
the pilot. FC and 
NAV lnstrUUlents will 
tell the truth, how-
ever. 
The pilot overrides 
and dhengag~B the 
IYltem. 
De .... nding if a mod. 
change take. plaCe! 
at busy part of the 
flight, or a mode jUdt 
quletiy op.n. up • 
No YID avail. 
PHot override 
Dllengage Y 10 
No roll Alp avail. 
PHot override 
Dhengage Alp. 
No pitch AlP avall. 
PHot override. 
Dllengage AlP. 
Monitor detect. trim 
runaway. open circuit-
rie., but not Dlotor 
faHurea (e.8., only 
One direction.) 
No Alp engaged. Pilot 
must override In J 
axel. 
~ 
01 
'I 
fAILURl fAILUkl 
WlTl*luG 
AFFECTED 
ELEMENTS 
EFFECTS OF 
FAIWR£ 
IlAAS f AILLIlt. 
NU. lJAAS LLUI£.,IT iiO. fAILURE WAIlII. LTC. CATt:GUkY CUlf1LUTS 
71 AlP-l/o 
CPU + B1M 
AID, D/A, HUX 
CONCl.USIOH; FAR 2) lDet regarding po .. lblUtiea to override. FAR 2) requirement on fault In only one channel not met. 
The pilot .. Ight end up In a critical .ituation if one or IIIOra of the oervo. or of the clutchu are not 
operational. No warning or Info given. The pHot h In a critical .!tuation if he haa to override 
aU 3 oervoo. The probability of not beina able to enga§& aU clutche, !a,,", lf4/4 hra. The probability 
of not being able to dhengage aU c1utchea h.-J (4'5'10 ) x (4·4.10- ) < 10- 2/4 hre. 
The probablUty of a critical aituation h negUalble: 01:. 
Fault In eny 
hardware 60 + 12 
60 
Almo.t aU 
element.: 
Erroneoua, 
Hode Itatul 
F/D-cOlllll8ndo 
aervo-coamand. 
Fit wamlna 
crui.e-perform. 
fuel dhtance 
YES 
BITE 
BITE ) 
The AlP-I/O COUlput 0 r 
1 •• key eleillent In 
MAS. Failure effect. 
of all categorlee may 
occur. For instance. 
a CPU failure may 
.ENERAL POSSIBLE FAILIIRE KlDES HUX AD CPU MEMORY D/A HUl IDDe Info 
~U olgnala high or low x x X EIISIlII8p 
Annunciator 
af fect separate in-
Itruction., e.g_ shift, 
which wlU .poll all 
multi and div. A 
72 
.. zero. x x x 
" faulty x 
" 
x 
oparate .Ion_ls .. x 
x x Error may affect 
only one function. 
e.g., door warn-
ing, or many 
elementa, e.g. OJA 
failure coumandlng 
3 lervoe hardover. 
~ 
~ ) 
D/A failure may caUBe 
aU outputs to go high, 
including .11 lervos 
end ADI cOlWUlnd bara. 
The bite coverage 10 about 951. It 11 very Ukely that BITE will detec~ even more of the aevere fallurea. A BITE coverage of 99.9% 1& 
requested to bring the probability of an undetected failure down to 10- 14 hra. 
NAV FLT If LAN 
CPU & BIH 
CONCLUSION: FAR 2) requirement on dhensegement and po .. lblUty to override 10 met. (The added lG-d",p-lwltch 1a helpful). 
FAR 2) requirement on only lingle axlx hardover failure 11 violated. It 11 probable that failureo occur which, 
detected or not by the BITE, will caule tranetento and shut down major part. of the MAS. The MAS co-pilot 
will, In auch a1tuationo, take over and DMS will b. dllen&_ged. 
Action. to reaolve the FAR confUct h recOlllllOnded. 
Fault In 
any hard-
ware 
CONCLUSION: 
60 + 12 Alp COOD. ba .. 
AlP lervo. 
EllS I 
IDeC 
NAV I, 2 
BUBBLE HEM. 
Erron. COUll. reference. 
Faulty map 
Faulty NAV into. 
Wrona frequenclea 
Store faulty NAVAID 
data 
YES 
BITE 
-6 -4 
Undetected err-oneoua 
NAV cOIIlputatjonl IWlY. 
during a fairly long 
tiae, Introduce AlC 
pOlition error •• Several 
Indicators may give con'" 
.btently faulty Info. 
LOll of NAVAlD after a 
detected fault may also 
bring problems to an 
unexpertenc~d pi lot. 
The probability of faulty NAV calculation. 11"" 4.12'10 ...J )'10 without reconflguration. 
1 -6 JIlL -6 2 lQ -4 The probability of faulty NAV calcu ationa IstV 4.72.10 (l-um> + (4.72.10 ) • (l-100}Al.6·10 with reconfilluratiun. 
Reconftguration Improv .. the availability of the NAV calculationl 5 tloll.... SI&nlf1cant Improvement. require. 
botter BITE coverage. . 
MAS with co-pilot OK. 
tillL"~L 
NO. 
71 
14 
15 
..... 
CJl 
00 
16 
71 
IJI\I\~ LLLlIl"l 
SPARE CPU & BIM 
RadiO Adapter 
Box & BIM 
DABS -
CPU + BIM 
Panel 
Transponder 
BUI controller 
and reconflg. 
CPU + BIM 
468 Bua 
f .. lLlJK~ AFFECTED EFFECTS OF IJAA~ fAILlJKl 
ItU. FhlLlIKf. kAll"lu· ELEMENTS FAILURE lJAki,. LTC;. ttlTLCU;;y LUIo/'ILla:. 
Fault in 60 + 12 EIISI or by Same failure effect • •• fault YES 2 S1IIIilar to faults 
any part. NAV computer 61 E1ISI, CPU, and 12 NAV CPU. BITE No. 61 and 12. 
controlled 
elements 
OONCLUSI0N: The likelihood that any .pare CPU or BIM failure will affect the DAAS performance 10 negligible. Becaule 2 .imilar 
tailur .. are r~iuired. the Et;0babilitX1for thla is: (NAV. FAIL + EIISI FAIL) • (SPARE FAIL) or 
(12 + 12)'4.10 • (72'4'10 ) ...... 2·10 • 
KR.C 
n,e apare CPU itaelf will not "arm the DAAS: 
Fault in 40 + 12 
any part 
EIISI 
IDCC 
Alp (ADI) 
Hlotune NAV lOME reeelv. 
Garble NAV data to NAV 
AlP CPU. which may affect 
vloual indicato .. and bug. 
aa well Alp 'aervo •• 
YES 
BITE 
CONCLUSION: The co-pilot backup NAV in.trwuentation makea DAAS OK. 
Any part 60 + 12 
failure 
I DeC No identification po18ible YES 
BITE 
Mtaleading lDeC info 
presented to the 1 pilot 
CONCLUSION: SEE ALSO FAULT NO. 50 KT-7M TRANSPONDER. 
DABS NOT FULLY DEFINED. 
Any part 60 + 12 
failure 
All DAAS 
computers & 
functions 
Power up mode. One or more YES 
fault. in one or more of tha BITE 
CPU' a when load ing tha pro-
grams 
Normal Hode 
1. Mlsinterpretation of validity 
ai80ab and .hutdown of fault-
free CPU. 
2. No warn. Biven for ..... BUS-CPU and 
lDeC-CPU faUure •• 
J. Bus control failure. may re.ult 
in miSled information or com-
plete bua traffic breakdown. 
Reconfiguration Hode 
The CPU .... y fail to recon-
figure. 
Fault. in 
wires or con-
EQUAL TO BUS CONTROL FAILURES NO. 16 
nector. 
CONCLUSION: Failure. in the bu. controller may affect more than 1 channel. 
The DAAS co-pilot provide. backup, making DAAS OK. 
J 
J 
The failure effects are 
dependent on engaged modes t 
e.g. during a coupled 
landing the IlAAS may con-
trol all indicators (except 
the RHI) .. well u the 
AlP .. rvOI and ADI bug •• 
No readable output. 
Traffic control tak •• 
proper action. 
The.e failure .. are 
expected to be 
detected by BITE 
or the pilot. 
The •• failure. might result 
in a demanding situation If 
they occur during a busy 
flight ph •• e. 
La .. of moat of the DMS 
function. in a busy flight 
phase 10 de .. anding. 
RenIta in 10 .. of EIISI 
or NAY computer. 
I. 
\ 
..... 
CJ1 
CD 
TAUlt 2 HILA 
FAlllJlll 
110. OMS ELI:.HUIT 
78 
79 
80 
81 
82 
83 
EEPROM Memory 
Cassette 
Alternator 
(Batt.) 
28VDC bua 
Avionic. bua 
28 VDC 
OMS A and B 
28 VDC bu. 
IlAAS bu. 115 
and 26 VAC 
, 
FAILU\{[ 
110. FAILURE 'RATE*lOb 
Any part 300 
failure 
AFFECTED 
ELEMENTS 
All OMS 
computers 
and func-
tiona 
EFFECTS OF 
FAIUlag 
UMS 
IIMII. LTC. 
FAILlJltt. 
CATl:.liOIlY 
All kind. of failurea might YES. Hem 3 
occur from aingle instruction 10m checka 
failure to all CPU instructions in the CPU'. 
faulty. 
CONCLUSIONI Failures affecting more than 1 channel may happen, FAR 23 violation. The most aevere failure 
CUlI1lllT~ 
A fault happening before 
flight will be detected 
by the mem. sum, cI.lI;~ck 
or by the pilot ~efore 
takeoff. A failure dUI'-
ing flight followed by a 
temp. power 10s8 Ulay. in 
a worse case, mean IOdS 
of the OMS. 
10 EEPROM memory failure in air, followed by a temporary power 10 •• during a demanding £hase -6 -7 
of the flight. The probability for thia to happen 10 eatimated at Ie •• than (300'4.10- ) ,. (50.4,10 ),..1 2,10 • 
The probability for critical failure. to occur due to the EEPROM memory is low enough to make IlAAS OK. 
Action i. recommended to resolve the FAR conflict. 
Any part 500 
, failure 
EEPROM mamory n.e failure effect. are .imilar YES 3 
to EEPROM memory faUure.. CPU me ... 
A fault will be detected 
before flight. 
CONCLUSIONI Ca. Bette 
cassette 
IUDl. check 
failurel will very likely b!6detected by BIT or the pilot before takeoff. 
faUure ia judged to be ('10 • OMS OK. The probability of an undetected 
Alternator., ,.....1 
Battery, bUI 
faUures 
All electrical Shut. down all major OMS 
unite except lenaora, 
OMS-buBe. 
Obvious 4 Very critical Bituation • 
CONCLUSION: No FAR 23 or 91 requirements on avionic. el. power bu. redundancy or failure probability. 
It i. assumed that the pilot quickly di.eogage. a faulty AIC battery if it fails when any alternator is OK. 
The probability~ of 10 •• ot the 28 VDC bua durins 4 !lt~ hrs. il thu!& _ -6 ~ '" Alt. A ,...( Alt. B ,.-1 Batt. +4 bUltv(200'4'10 ) ,. (100'4'10 ) + .1'10 6,v.l'10 
NOTE: The battery will be drained in leaa than 1 fit. hr. (Before the battery ia drained, the probability of 
open or .horted bUI ia the most likely re.aon for electrical power loa.). 
Connection., r-J I 
switches bua • 
Audio NAV, Lo .. of cOUlllunication. 
DIIE, X-ponder, 
NO 4 
etc. 
CONCLUSION I Tha reduncant line. and switcha. make the avionic. bu. as aafa .1 the alternator 28VDC bUI. 
(Pilot and co-pilot instrumentation electrical power should, in principal, b. I.parated.) 
Connectiona, I'V.S 
switchel, 
diod., battery, 
buse. 
IlAAS CPU'. 
memoriel, 
ElISI, IDCC, 
FCS, etc. 
Shut. down DAAS YES 
BITE 
3 
CONCl.USIOOI OMS with co-pilot, demand ins 3. Still low probability of electrical power 10": 
Lines, 10 
switchu, 
converters 
DIR & vert. gyro Error. or no attitude refer- YES 
ADI, RHI, ADC enceo, etc. "VALIDITY" 
dgn condit. 
CONCWSIONI LOBI of IlAAS-AC judged OK. 
3 
Affecta both the pilot 
and co-pilot cOOlDun. NAV 
equipment. 
Reliability degradation 
10 due to Binsle .witche. 
and Une •• 
~ 
en 
o 
___ 0-_-
~IIIL~HL 
NO. 
84 
85 
86 
ADDITION 
UI\II$ LLLIlLllT 
JlAAS 15VDC 
DMS 12VDC 
JlAAS 5VDC 
JlAAS Soft-
ware 
flllLuKl AFFECTED EFFECTS OF lJAAS 
IILI. FAILUKl ItATl*lO" ELEMENTS FAILURE 11Ak1i. LTC. 
Lin •• 15 ANALOG 1/0 HOlt .enlor input. mls8 'og. YES 
switches BlTE 
inverter 
18 Bubble He ... Reconfiguration not po.dble. NO 
15 IDCC Shut down of JlAAS Obvlou. 
CPU'. 
CONCUISION: Failure. 84 and 86 can be accepted In JlAAS due to the co-pilot backup. 
ALL CPU'. 
FAR 2) is not lIlet for electrical power failures 82 to 86. 
Actions are l'ecolllQended. 
unknown AlP. lervol. 
EllS I , IDCC, etc. 
Any type of erroneous COlU. NO 
and Information. 
CONCLUSION: The JlAAS co-pilot will take over and JlAAS will be dhengaged. OK. 
I 
.J 
FAILUIlL 
CIITlIiUKY 
) 
L..tll'llllT~ 
Probability of 
~cconflgurat ion low. 
1 
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